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McCormack: America’s (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws

AMERICA’S (D)EVOLVING CHILDCARE TAX
LAWS
Shannon Weeks McCormack*
Proponents touted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (the
TCJA)—enacted in the twilight of 2017—by claiming it
would help American working families. But while the
TCJA expanded some benefits available to parents with
dependent children, these parental tax benefits may be
claimed regardless of whether or to what extent
childcare costs are incurred to work outside the home.
To help working parents with these (often significant)
costs, Congress might have turned to two other
mechanisms in the tax law—the “child and dependent
care credit” and the “dependent care exclusion.” While
these childcare tax benefits are only available to working
parents that pay for childcare, stringent limitations
have kept many from recovering anything near their
actual costs, particularly in the critical years before
children reach school-age. As a result, the Code was
taxing families with different childcare needs
inequitably. And because the TCJA left these childcare
tax laws untouched, it did nothing to address this
problem. By exploring critical junctures in their
development, this Article seeks to understand how
America’s tax laws have (d)evolved in this manner and,
in doing so, situates some of the TCJA’s alleged reforms
into their historical context.
America’s childcare tax laws have not always been so
limiting. In the seventies and eighties, the Code evolved
significantly to allow working parents to claim relief for
* Shannon Weeks McCormack, Garvey Schubert & Barer Professor of Law, University of
Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Mary Whisner and others in the Gallagher Law
Library as well as Cynthia Fester, Erik Martes, Steven Matyas, Jane Pryjmak, and Bryce
Nelson for extraordinary research assistance. Thank you also to Lawrence Zelenak and
participants of the Duke Tax Policy Seminar for their helpful comments.
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a relatively substantial portion of their childcare costs,
resulting in more equitable taxation of family models.
But in the decades following this evolution, Congress
generally failed to adjust childcare tax benefits—even
for inflation—allowing them to devolve in real value as
childcare costs rose. Meanwhile, Congress created new
and expanded existing tax benefits available to all
parents even if they did not need childcare. Thus, over
the past several decades, Congress not only restored but
also perpetuated the inequitable taxation of different
family models that had been remedied by earlier
reforms. The changes made by the TCJA are, therefore,
just the latest iteration of a decades-old trend.
In addition to revealing that the TCJA was a tepid if
not specious attempt to address the working family’s
plight, this history raises broader questions of political
feasibility. This Article identifies several factors such as
increased legal complexity, sophistic political rhetoric
and changed normative expectations to explain the
electorate’s seeming apathy to our childcare tax laws’
(d)evolution. Using this context, this Article argues that
even modest changes to our childcare tax laws, while
incapable of enacting systemic changes on their own,
could nevertheless enact historically significant reform
and revive dormant debates about the role the American
government should play in supporting parents.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, American working parents find themselves in a
“care crisis,”1 struggling to pay childcare costs, which can exceed
rent and college tuition2 and are reportedly rising faster than both
inflation3 and their salaries.4 At least when campaigning,
politicians and lawmakers from the left, right and center seem to
agree that this problem must be addressed.5 There is, of course, far
less agreement about how to do so.

1 See RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
CHANGED AMERICA 360 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ROSEN, WORLD SPLIT OPEN] (referring to
the lack of options for affordable, accessible childcare as a problem “most American women
suffered privately, without realizing that the care crisis [i]s a pandemic problem among
working- and middle-class families”); see also Ruth Rosen, The Care Crisis, THE NATION (Feb.
27, 2007), https://www.thenation.com/article/care-crisis/ (“Although we have shelves full of
books that address work/family problems, we still have not named the burdens that affect
most of America’s working families. Call it the care crisis.”).
2 CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILDCARE 20 (2017),
https://usa.childcareaware.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/2017_CCA_High_Cost_Report_FI
NAL.pdf.
3 See
LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO’S MINDING THE KIDS?
CHILDCARE ARRANGEMENTS: SPRING 2011 17 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs
/p70-135.pdf (finding costs of childcare have increased substantially since 1985, even when
dollars are adjusted to constant value); Eric Morath, Soaring Child-Care Costs Squeeze
Families, WALL STREET J. (July 1, 2016, 7:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/soaringchild-care-costs-squeeze-families-1467415411 (reporting that “[c]hild care expenses alone
have climbed nearly twice as fast as overall prices since the recession ended in 2009”). But
see Andrew Flowers, The Cost of Child Care Might Not be Skyrocketing, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(July
23, 2015),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-cost-of-child-care-might-not-beskyrocketing/ (questioning whether childcare costs are rising as quickly as some reports
imply).
4 During her run for President, Hillary Rodham Clinton explained that “[t]he cost of child
care has increased by nearly 25 percent during the past decade, while the wages of working
families have stagnated.” Early Childhood Education, THE OFFICE OF HILLARY RODHAM
CLINTON, www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/early-childhood-education/ (reproducing campaign
proposal) (last accessed Jan. 1, 2019).
5 See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb & Juliet Eilperin, Childcare Issues Move to Political
Forefront as Both Parties Position for Midterms, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/child-care-issues-move-to-political-forefront-asboth-parties-position-for-midterms/2014/06/22/01db633c-f986
11e3a3a542be35962a52_story.html (“Paid leave and access to child care are surging to the
top of the nation’s political debate as Democrats and Republicans seek to win votes and
advance policies to address the economic struggles of families trying to raise children and
hold jobs.”).
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Proponents of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)6 created a sticky
narrative, which painted it as a relief measure for working families.7
But while the TCJA expanded some benefits available to parents
with dependent children, these parental tax benefits do not depend
on whether or to what extent childcare costs are incurred to earn
income.8
To address these expenses, Congress could have reformed two
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), which allow
working parents to recover some childcare costs. Due to strict
limitations, many working parents—especially those with preschool
aged children—were only able to claim tax relief for a fraction of
their annual costs.9 As a result, the Code was taxing families with
different childcare needs inequitably. The TCJA, however, did not
alter these “childcare tax laws” and thus failed to address this
problem.10 By exploring critical junctures in the development of
these laws, this Article seeks to understand how America came to
tax parents in this inequitable manner.
The story starts with a case called Smith v. Commissioner.11
Decided in the 1930s when, according to the Board of Tax Appeals

6 Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2051 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). Many commentators refer to this legislation as the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” or
“TCJA,” although it was not the official name of the Act that was passed and signed into law.
7 Following House passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Congressman Jack Bergman
stated, “Today, for the first time in 30 years, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to
reform the tax code and provide much needed relief for working families . . . .” Press Release,
Congressman Jack Bergman, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://bergman.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=136. Advocating for the
TCJA in late November, President Donald J. Trump claimed that “[t]he beating heart of [the]
plan is a tax cut for working families.” President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Tax Reform
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumptax-reform-2/. Majority Whip Scalice commented, “The good news is, that changes today with
this tax cut plan that finally puts money back in the pockets of working families.”
Representative Steve Scalise, Remarks on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://scalise.house.gov/press-release/scalise-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-families-are-going-getmore-their-paychecks.
8 See infra Part III.C.
9 See generally Shannon Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam
and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2016) [hereinafter Weeks McCormack,
Overtaxing the Working Family].
10 See infra Part III.C.
11 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff’d mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
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(B.T.A.), “the working wife [wa]s a new phenomenon,”12 the Code
did not yet explicitly address whether working parents could
recover childcare costs in order to reduce their taxable income.13
Instead, the Smiths asked to deduct these costs under general
sections of the Code that allow taxpayers to fully deduct expenses
“ordinary” to a trade, business, or other profit-seeking venture.14
The B.T.A. declined, deciding that the expenses were personal.15
When a “wife has chosen to employ others to discharge her domestic
function” in order to venture into the external workplace, she may
not, the B.T.A. concluded, deduct the costs of doing so to reduce her
federal income taxes.16
After Smith, lawmakers began to debate the (then explicitly
gendered) question of whether working mothers should be able to
recover the costs of childcare when calculating their tax liability.17
In 1954—a year in which the Code was so massively reorganized
that it was re-codified in its entirety18—this question was the
subject of robust debates, which centered on whether the
government should provide tax relief only to mothers that needed
to work outside the home or also to mothers that participated in the
external workplace when financial necessity did not require it. One
congressperson, for instance, spoke scornfully of the
“women . . . who . . . neglect [their family] obligations . . . to work
and earn money which they can spend upon themselves in spite of
the fact that their husbands are earning enough for a pretty fair
living.”19
12 Id. at 1039. As will be discussed later, women of color had long been in the workforce,
but white women were in the workforce at much lower numbers. See, e.g., BART LANDRY,
BLACK WORKING WIVES: PIONEERS OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY REVOLUTION 79–81 (2000).
13 See Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039 (noting that “the expenses in issue are now. . .
commonplace [but] yet have not been the subject of legislation, ruling, or adjudicated
controversy.”).
14 See id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See infra Sections I.C.
18 See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 1 (1954) (stating that the 1954 Code represented “the first
comprehensive revision of the internal-revenue laws since before the turn of the century and
the enactment of the income tax”); see also H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 1 (1954) (same).
19 General Revenue Revision: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means on Forty
Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong. 63 (1953)
(statement of Rep. Noah M. Mason); see also John R. Nelson, Jr. & Wendy E. Warring, The
Child Care Tax Deduction/Credit, in MAKING POLICIES FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE
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Congress ultimately crafted the 1954 laws to provide tax relief
only to mothers that had to enter the paid labor force. Regardless of
their means, single mothers and “widowers”20 were entitled to
deduct (i.e. subtract from their taxable income) childcare expenses
up to a dollar maximum designed to cover most, if not all, of their
childcare costs.21 But for “working wives,” the full deduction was
only available if she and her spouse earned less than a designated
amount. This amount hovered around the median income for all
American families and was slightly less than the median income for
two-earner families at the time.22 The deduction was phased out
once a family’s income exceeded this level and lost completely once
it exceeded an amount close to the median income for two-earner
families in 1954 (about 120% of the median income for all American

FEDERAL PROCESS 206, 216–18 (Cheryl D. Hayes ed., 1982) (discussing legislators’ concerns
about the proposed child care deduction).
20 I.R.C. § 214 (c)(2) (1954) (repealed 1976) (defining a widower as including “an unmarried
individual who is legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance”).
21 I.R.C. § 214(b)(1) (1954) (repealed 1976); see also Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at
219–20 (“The bill specified that the deduction could not exceed $600 — a figure based on the
estimated median monthly cost of childcare, $50.”).
22 See I.R.C. § 214(b)(2) (1954) (the deduction for “[w]orking wives . . . shall be reduced by
the amount (if any) by which the adjusted gross income of the taxpayer and her spouse
exceeds $4,500”). Because the deduction is capped at $600, it would be lost completely once
income reached $5,100. For consistency in reporting median income figures, this Article relies
on U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES: HOUSEHOLDS, tbl.F-12,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-incomefamilies.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Census Historical Income Tables]
(providing family income based on number of earners in “current” and 2017 CPI-U-RS
adjusted dollars from 1947 through 2017) According to this table, median income in 1954 was
$4,167 and $5,000 for “all families” and “two earners” families. Thus, $4,500 (the point at
which the phase-out began) was about 108% and 90% of median for all and two earner
families, respectively while $5,100 (the point at which the phase out was complete)
represented 122% and 102% of median for all and two earning families, respectively. Another
Census source reports that median income for all U.S. families in 1954 at $4,173, and the
median income of families “with wife in paid labor force” at $5,336. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, 296 tbl.G 179–188
(1976),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial1970/hist_stats_colonial-1970p1-chG.pdf?# [hereinafter CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
Thus, $4,500 (the point at which the phase-out began) represented about 108% of the median
income of all families and 84% of the median for families with wife in the paid labor force,
while $5,100 (the point at which the phase out was complete) represented about 122% of the
median for all families and about 96% of the median for families with wife in the paid labor
force.
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families that year).23 The Code, therefore, taxed single parents and
widowers rather equitably, as well as married parents of low and
moderate means. But by deliberate design, the Code favored the
one-breadwinner model for married families of above-moderate
means.
Starting in the 1960s, however, some highly visible, feminist
groups24 pressured lawmakers for legal reforms that would make
childcare affordable for all working mothers, sometimes even
identifying tax reform as part of that agenda. In its founding
documents, for example, the National Organization for Women
(NOW) demanded “[i]mmediate revision of [the] tax laws to permit
the deduction of home and child-care expenses for working
parents”25 and organized a “Baby Carriage Brigade” outside of the
U.S. Tax Court to support a working mother claiming the
constitutional right to deduct childcare costs.26 Pushing strollers,
demonstrators protested what they viewed as a sexist tax code that
allowed all sorts of business expenses to be deducted but severely
limited the ability of women to recover the childcare expenses they
incurred to participate in the paid, public sphere. The
demonstration’s slogan—“Are Children As Important As
Martinis?”27—poignantly raised a fundamental question of tax
policy that remains unresolved today: Why don’t we allow all
working parents to recover childcare expenses like so many other
costs of earning income?
Congress has never been willing to allow parents to deduct all
childcare expenses. But reforms in the mid-seventies and early
eighties brought the Code closer than it has ever been before or
since. During this time, income limitations were eliminated and
dollar limits were raised to historically generous levels, allowing all
working parents to claim tax relief for a relatively substantial

23 See Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22; see also CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 296 tbl.G, 179–188.
24 A more inclusive discussion of “Second Wave feminism” will be provided in Section IV. A.
25 See NOW Bill of Rights, reprinted in “TAKIN’ IT TO THE STREETS:” A SIXTIES READER,
473–75 (Alexander Bloom & Wini Breines eds., 1995) [hereinafter NOW Bill of Rights].
26 ROSEN, WORLD SPLIT OPEN, supra note 1, at xxiiixxii (providing a chronology which lists
as an event occurring in 1971: “New York NOW forms a ‘Baby Carriage Brigade’ to
demonstrate its support of women’s right to deduct childcare expenses. ‘Are Children As
Important As Martinis?’ is their slogan.”).
27 Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss3/6
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portion of their childcare expenses.28 America’s childcare tax laws,
therefore, evolved to tax families with different childcare needs
much more equitably.
The story of what happened next is deceptively simple: since the
mid-eighties, Congress has increased the childcare tax law’s dollar
limitations only once, not even keeping limits indexed for inflation.29
Today’s childcare tax laws are, for many families, more restrictive
than they have been at many points in history.30 The story of why
our childcare tax laws devolved in this manner is more complex.
Since 1981, lawmakers have proposed hundreds of bills to modify
these laws.31 In the 114th Congress alone, at least two-dozen bills
were introduced and ultimately perished in Committee.32
But since the mid-eighties, instead of making significant
adjustments to the childcare tax laws, Congress created new and
expanded existing tax benefits for parents with dependent children.
For instance, during the childcare tax law’s devolutionary period,
Congress created and expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) and Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), available to
working poor families.33 Thus, as it has historically done, the Code
continued to provide substantial (which is not to say adequate) tax
benefits to working poor families that must, out of economic
necessity, work outside the home.
Yet Congress did not stop there. In the mid-nineties, it expanded
the tax benefits available to families in the middle and uppermiddle classes by, for instance, creating the child tax credit—also
known as the CTC and not to be confused with the childcare tax
credit.34 And it consistently increased the pre-existing personal
exemption and standard deduction amounts available to all
parents.35 But none of these benefits depend on whether or to what
extent a family incurs childcare costs and, therefore, do nothing to

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.A. For a discussion of the method that this article uses to index
amounts for inflation, please see infra note 143.
30 See infra Section III.A.
31 See infra Section III.A.
32 See supra note 262.
33 See infra Section III.B.
34 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, § 101, Pub. L. No. 105–34, 111 Stat. 788, 796–99 (1997)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 24) (establishing a $500 credit per child).
35 See infra Section III.B.2.
28
29
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stymie the gradual erosion of childcare tax benefits or reduce the
inequitable taxation of families with different childcare needs.
Because the TCJA’s parental tax “reforms” expanded parental tax
benefits like the CTC while leaving the childcare tax laws
unaltered,36 Congress simply continued its already decades old
trend.
In addition to showing that the TCJA’s changes were an
inadequate, if not spurious, response to the working family’s “care
crisis”, the (d)evolution of our childcare and parental tax laws raises
questions of political feasibility. While one would expect vehement
objections from some constituencies, such as dual-earner and singleparent families, nothing resembling the backlash of the seventies
and eighties has occurred. Where are the demonstrations asking
whether children are more important than martinis? Why aren’t
working families demanding change? This Article explores several
reasons for the apparent indifference.
Today’s parental tax laws are more complex than they were in
the seventies and eighties, consisting of an alphabet soup of
benefits, whose different purposes may not be readily discernible to
the non-tax expert.37 Further, the rhetoric employed to defend this
stew is superficially persuasive.38 Whereas their predecessors were
bald in their assertions about gender roles, today’s lawmakers
utilize arguments that can appear normatively sterile.39 Extending
benefits to all parents through mechanisms like the CTC, some
lawmakers claim, allows each family to choose the earning
arrangement that is best for them.40 These arguments are
specious—the Code already favors families that do not incur these
expenses and does not tax families neutrally.41 But these
argumentative flaws may not be readily apparent to the untrained
eye.
Moreover, parent’s expectations about the role the American
government should play in their lives have changed dramatically
since the seventies. In 1971, after it passed both Houses of

36
37
38
39
40
41

See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section I.A.
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Congress, President Nixon surprised activists by vetoing the
Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971 that would have made
universally subsidized childcare available to all parents, regardless
of means.42 But today, working parents of small children were
probably not born when that bill was vetoed, or far too young to
remember it. As one expert writes, “[w]hile a number of developed
countries provide early child care the same way they provide
kindergarten, most Americans take it as a given that they are on
their own” unaware “that the government has [ever] seriously
considered offering anything more than a patchwork system to help
the very poor.”43 Today, the peculiarly American norm of
individualism—“the belief that we should be self-sufficient in
providing [child] care, without any need for government
support”44—is often accepted without examination.
Finally, once put in its broader political context, the history of
our childcare and parental tax laws can inform debates about their
future. Reflecting our politics, recent proposals have spanned
historical extremes. On one side of the spectrum, politically liberal
plans call for the creation of government programs like universal
preschool that compare in ambition and scope to those contemplated
by the vetoed Economic Opportunity Amendments.45 In contrast,
other politically conservative proposals seem to put even the
existence of the childcare tax laws into question.46 Between these
two extremes lie reforms to our (d)evolved childcare tax laws. Such
reforms, while not capable of enacting system-wide changes on their
own, might nonetheless tax families more equitably, move the tax
law in directions that have been historically resisted, and revive
long dormant debates about the role the American government
should play in the lives of parents.
42 See 117 CONG. REC. 46,057–59 (1971) (reporting on President Nixon’s veto message
concerning the Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1971); see also GAIL COLLINS, WHEN
EVERYTHING CHANGED: THE AMAZING JOURNEY OF AMERICAN WOMEN FROM 1960 TO THE
PRESENT 286 (2009) (explaining that through the Economic Opportunity Amendments of
1971, the optional childcare would have been free for lower-class households, most middleclass households would have received a subsidy, and households in the top 25 percent would
have paid the full fee).
43 COLLINS, supra note 42, at 285.
44 Lonnie Golden, Robert W. Drago’s Striking a Balance: Work, Family, Life, 62 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 622, 623 (2009) (book review).
45 See infra Section IV.B.
46 See infra Section IV.B.
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This Article proceeds in four sections. After summarizing current
childcare tax laws, Section I tracks the early history of these laws,
which were designed to benefit only mothers who needed to work
and deliberately favored the one-breadwinner model for married
families of above-moderate means. Section II turns to the seventies
and eighties, during which our childcare tax laws evolved to allow
most working parents to recover a significant portion of their
childcare costs, and, therefore, taxed family models more equitably
than predecessor laws. Section III describes the decades following
this evolution, during which childcare tax benefits devolved while
other parental tax benefits that did not depend on actual childcare
costs were expanded. This history shows that the TCJA’s supposed
“reforms” are just another piece of a well-worn pattern that leads to
the inequitable taxation of families with different childcare needs.
Section IV discusses why this (d)evolution was politically feasible
and couples these insights with the history developed in the first
three sections to inform debates about future tax reforms that may
actually address the American working family’s “care crisis.” A brief
conclusion follows.
I. THE CHILDCARE TAX LAWS’ EARLY HISTORY
While the Code allows parents to recover some of the childcare
costs they incur to work outside the home, it contains many limits.
Many working parents will receive tax relief for only a fraction of
the costs they actually incur, particularly in the critical years before
children reach school age. The first part of this section will show
how our “childcare tax laws” have long resulted in the inequitable
taxation of families with different childcare needs and how the
TCJA did nothing to address these problems. Second, this section
begins the task of understanding how we came to have these
childcare tax laws by tracing their early historical development.
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A. PRESENT LAW AND A PRIMER ON BASIC TAX PRINCIPLES

1. Imputed Income is not taxed
Just as families are composed in many different ways, the ways
in which families allocate the responsibilities of childrearing and
earning income differ. The tax law has long built in a preference for
families that do not need to purchase childcare on the external
market by failing to tax the so-called imputed income produced
when parents care for their children or secure other non-paid
childcare arrangements with family members or neighbors.47 By not
taxing the value created (or, put another way, the money saved)
from these internal arrangements, the Code taxes families with
different childcare needs inequitably.
For instance, assume two couples, the As and Bs, are each
married and file joint returns. Suppose that both couples earn
$50,000 this year. The As adhere to the “one breadwinner model”—
Mr. A earns all of the family’s monetary income while Mrs. A cares
for their two preschool aged children. By contrast, Mr. and Mrs. B
are “dual-earners”—each work outside the home and, therefore,
must purchase day care for their two preschool aged sons. While the
As and Bs both earn the same monetary income, the As are better
off because they do not have to pay for childcare to do so.
And for many families, especially those with young children,
childcare is no small expense. During her run for president, Hillary
Rodham Clinton explained that “[t]he cost of child care has
increased by nearly 25 percent during the past decade, while the
wages of working families have stagnated.”48 In the ten most
expensive states, the annual cost of a day care center—the most
common paid childcare arrangement49—ranges from $17,082 to
$10,317 per year50 for one infant and from $16,598 to $23,40051 for
two preschool aged children.

47 See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1576 (1996) (explaining
that the U.S. does not tax the imputed income of childcare, which is “the value of childcare
services provided by a family member” even though “the value of identical services provided
by a neighbor or a childcare center would produce a tax burden”).
48 Early Childhood Education, supra note 4.
49 CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., supra note 2, 13 tbl.1.
50 Id. at 14 tbl.1.
51 Id. at 16 tbl.5.
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Due to their savings on childcare costs, the As are significantly
better off than the Bs, and should have higher taxable income than
the Bs. The As’ income could be accurately reflected by taxing the
imputed income produced by Mrs. A—i.e. taxing the value of the
care she provides to her children. But the Code has never done this,
for reasons not limited to concerns about proper valuation, privacy
and public perception.52 As a result, the taxable income of onebreadwinner families such as the As is understated—and these
families are, therefore, under-taxed—compared to two-earner
couples like the Bs who must siphon off (sometimes significant)
portions of their earned income to pay for childcare.
A similar inequity exists among single parent families, who may
often file as “heads of household.”53 Suppose that single parents C
and D earn the same taxable income. If C must pay for childcare
while she is working, while D is able to secure non-paid care—with,
for instance, a relative—the failure to tax the imputed income
produced by D’s internal childcare arrangement results in her being
under-taxed compared to C.
2. Working Childcare Benefits Are Significantly Limited
Taxing the imputed income of non-paid care is not the only way
to correct these inequities. The Code could instead allow parents to
reduce their tax liability to reflect the costs of childcare incurred to
work. But the Code has long limited parent’s ability to do so and
these limits remain unchanged by the TCJA. The Code (both preand post-TCJA) allows working parents to recover childcare costs in
one of two ways. Working parents may claim the “dependent care
exclusion” which allows them to exclude from their taxable income54
up to $5,000 of the childcare costs they incur while working.55
Alternatively, they may claim the “child and dependent care credit,”
commonly referred to as the “childcare credit,” which allows them

52 This is not to say it is not possible, and Professor Nancy Staudt has written an extremely
lucid Article explaining not only how it could be done, but also the merits of doing so. See
generally Staudt, supra note 47.
53 See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2012) (defining head of household); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B.
615 tbl.2 (promulgating 2016 tax rates applicable to heads of households).
54 That is, they do not have to include $5,000 in taxable income, and therefore do not have
to pay the tax that otherwise would be due on that portion of their income.
55 I.R.C. § 129(2)(A) (2012).
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to credit56 a percentage of these childcare costs up to $3,000 for one
child or $6,000 for multiple children.57 (Hereinafter, the dependent
care exclusion and child and dependent care credit will be referred
to collectively as the “childcare tax benefits”).
Working families may choose the childcare tax benefits that
result in the greatest tax savings, so long as they do not duplicate
claims.58 But regardless of which benefits they claim, the applicable
dollar caps represent only a fraction of the costs that many working
families—particularly those with young children—will incur. For
parents needing full time care for two preschool children in the most
expensive states, for instance, the caps on the childcare tax benefits
represent somewhere between 36% and 21% of total costs.59
In addition to dollar limitations, the childcare credit is subject to
a steep income phase down––i.e. the allowable tax credit is reduced
as taxable income increases beyond a certain threshold. Families
earning less than $15,000 may claim a thirty-five percent credit,
allowing for a maximum credit of $1,050 for one child and $2,100 for
multiple children.60 But the credit starts to phase down once a
family earns more than $15,000—an amount that represents
around 21% of the median income of all families in 201661 and about
15% of the median income of two-earner families that year.62
Families earning anything more than $43,000—less than half the
2016 median income for American two-earner families63 and about
60% of the median income for all families64—may claim only a
twenty-percent credit, allowing a tax savings of no more than $600
for one child and $1,200 for multiple children.65
That is, they may reduce their tax liability dollar-for-dollar by the prescribed amount.
I.R.C. § 21 (2012).
58 I.R.C. § 21(c) (2012) (providing for a reduced credit when taxpayers take an exclusion
under § 129).
59 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
60 I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2012) (noting that the “applicable percentage” before phase out is 35%).
61 See Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22 (reporting median income by
number of earners). To approximate the median income of dual earning families, this Article
looked at “two earner” families in Table F-12, supra note 22. It is possible that the two earners
are not two adult parents (e.g. are adult children). But this figure suffices for this Article’s
purposes of making comparisons across time. See id. (reporting 2016 income for all families
at $72,707 and $97,324 for “two earner” families)..
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2012) (credit phases down to floor of 20%).
56
57
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Due to these phase-downs, families in higher-income ranges will
generally benefit more from the dependent care exclusion. But the
$5,000 cap ensures that many families who claim the exclusion will,
like those claiming the credit, receive tax relief for only a fraction of
their childcare costs, especially during the early years of their
children’s lives.66 The tax savings offered by the dependent care
exclusion increase with the taxpayer’s marginal tax bracket, 67 and
total savings will top out at $2,180 in 201668 and $2,050 in 2018
(because the TCJA lowered the top bracket to 37%).
One does not need to comprehend all of this detail in order to
understand the consequences of these laws. The limitations
contained in I.R.C. §§ 21 and 129, which respectively grant the
childcare credit and dependent care exclusion, will often fall far
short of the costs families actually incur, particularly for families
with young children.69 Thus, working families, such as our
hypothetical Bs and single parent C, may recover only a fraction of
the childcare costs they incur to work outside the home. The
childcare tax benefits provided by §§ 21 and 129 will, in many
instances, fail to compensate for the Code’s failure to tax the
imputed income produced by non-paid childcare arrangements. Put
another way, when families are unable to fully recover their
working childcare costs, they will be overtaxed compared to
otherwise similarly situated families that do not incur these costs
(or incur less of them).
3. The TCJA Did Not Address These Inequities

66 In 2016, a dual-earner couple filing a joint return would have benefited more from the
exclusion than the credit once the couple earned above $80,000. A single custodial parent
filing as head of household would generally benefit more from the exclusion once she earned
above $55,000. At those income levels, taxpayers filing under either status moved into a 25%
tax bracket that would render the $1,250 savings from a $5,000 exclusion more than the
phased-down credit of $1,200. See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615 (promulgating 2016
tax rates).
67 Of course, tax rates change each year and were altered under the TCJA. The significant
points of this Article are not, however, undermined.
68 The maximum tax savings will be enjoyed by those in the top marginal tax bracket, but
the savings are still limited to $2,180—the value of the maximum exclusion (39.6% of $5,000)
plus the $200 tax credit allowed under I.R.C. § 21(c)(2) (2012) (assuming the $6,000 maximum
credit for two or more children, the $200 constitutes 20% of the $1,000 that would still be
creditable).
69 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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The TCJA was touted as a tax cut for working families.70 One
might have, therefore, expected that it would have significantly
reformed our childcare tax laws. But the TCJA ignored them
entirely, doing nothing to correct for the inequitable taxation of
families with different childcare needs.71
Severely limiting the ability of families to recover their working
childcare costs is questionable under fundamental principles of tax
policy.72 An income tax system generally seeks to tax profit and,
therefore, often allows taxpayers to fully deduct many costs of
earning income.73 If, for instance, a shopkeeper earned $100 selling
his wares but paid $70 to rent his storefront, he would generally
deduct $70 and would have only $30 taxable income.74 To the extent
that childcare expenses are also costs of earning income, then some
significant recovery of these costs is justified to ensure that working
parents are only taxed on their profits. But our childcare tax laws
sometimes stray far from this mark. I have argued at length
elsewhere that policy makers should reform the Internal Revenue
Code to treat working childcare expenses like other, recoverable
costs of earning income.75 I will, therefore, not press on these points
further here. Instead, this Article explores a different question: How
did we get here? How have we arrived at our current childcare tax
laws, which create (sometimes severe) inequities between parents
with different childcare needs?

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See infra Section III.C.
72 See Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 9 at 579 (explaining
that “[s]ince its inception, the U.S. system of taxation has aimed to tax net income—that is,
a taxpayer’s profits” (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. United States, 459
F.2d 513, 518 (Ct. Cl. 1972))); see also Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and
the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323, 1350–66 (2017) [hereinafter Weeks McCormack,
Postpartum Taxation](arguing that the failure to treat childcare costs incurred by working
parents as deductible costs of earning income leads to inequitable tax relief).
73 Though this does not always hold true. To cite just two examples, taxpayers are not
allowed to deduct commuting expenses and are limited in the extent to which they may deduct
meal and entertainment expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b)(5) (prohibiting deduction for
commuting costs and limiting meal expense deductions to meals eaten while traveling away
from home).
74 I.R.C. § 162 (2012) (allowing deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses).
75 See Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 9, at 580; see also
Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation, supra note 78, at 1350–66.
70
71
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To answer these questions, we begin with the judiciary’s early
role in shaping these laws.76
B. THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN SHAPING OUR CHILDCARE TAX LAWS

Most stories about taxation and working childcare costs begin
with Smith v. Commissioner,77 decided in 1939, when Judge Opper,
writing for the Board of Tax Appeals (B.T.A.), believed “the working
wife [to be] a new phenomenon.”78 In this case, the B.T.A.
determined that Mrs.79 Smith could not deduct the childcare
expenses she incurred to work outside the home.80 At the time the
case was considered, the Code did not contain provisions dealing
explicitly with the recoverability of childcare costs. Thus, the
Smiths argued, these expenses should be deductible under the
general provisions of the Code—now §§ 162 and 212—which allow
taxpayers to deduct expenses ordinary and necessary to the conduct
of one’s trade, business or other profit-seeking venture.81
The B.T.A. rejected the taxpayer’s argument that Mrs. Smith’s
childcare expenses should be deductible under a “but for” test—i.e.
“but for” the childcare expenses, Mrs. Smith could not work—and
proceeded to list the other types of expenses that might be

76 This Section, therefore, is very deliberate in its scope. For instance, it does not deal with
the Personal Exemption or Child Tax Credit, which provide benefits without regard to
whether costs are incurred to work and which are discussed infra, at Section II. Additionally,
this does not deal with the EITC, which does not hinge on actual childcare costs, which is
available only to families in or near poverty, and which is discussed infra in Section II.
77 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff’d mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). Cf. Edward J. McCaffery,
Taxing
Women,
ENG’G
&
SCI.,
No.
4
1997,
at
34,
http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/3932/1/Women.pdf (“Our tax system has a strong bias
against two-earner, married families. This bias came to be because of a series of decisions
made in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, and hardly reexamined since.”).
78 Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039. In fact, women of color had long been in the external
workforce, so this assertion represents a very limited view. See LANDRY, supra note 12, at 82–
83 (discussing how “in the early twentieth century few whites were prepared to accept this
new paradigm” of women participating in the workforce).
79 Mrs. is used to signal that Mrs. Smith is married and to be consistent with the language
used in the case. It is not meant to undermine the general feminist preference for Ms.
80 See Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039 (listing out “the very essence of those ‘personal’ expenses
the deductibility of which is expressly denied”).
81 See id. (discussing “those activities, which, as a matter of common acceptance and
universal experience, are ‘ordinary’ or usual as the direct accompaniment of business
pursuits”).
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inappropriately deducted if it were to adopt the “but for” proposition
the Smiths advocated.82 It wrote:
The fee to the doctor, but for whose healing service the
earner of the family income could not leave his sickbed;
the cost of the laborer’s raiment, for how can the world
proceed about its business unclothed; the very home
which gives us shelter and rest and the food which
provides energy, might all by an extension of the same
proposition be construed as necessary to the operation
of business and to the creation of income. Yet these are
the very essence of those “personal” expenses the
deductibility of which is expressly denied.83
Putting the acerbic tone aside, even students with a very
elementary training in (any sort of) law should quickly identify the
flaw in the Court’s reasoning. Expenses incurred to see a doctor, to
clothe oneself, and to attain shelter are not necessitated by the fact
that one works. Expenses incurred to attain childcare during
working hours are necessary.84 Put another way, work is a “but for”
cause of the childcare expenses, but not the other costs the B.T.A.
notes.
After presenting this reasoning, such as it is, Judge Opper
offered additional exposition:
The wife’s services as custodian of the home and
protector of its children are ordinarily rendered without
monetary compensation . . . . Here the wife has chosen
to employ others to discharge her domestic function and
the services she performs are rendered outside the
home. They are a source of actual income and taxable
as such. But that does not deprive the same work
performed by others of its personal character nor
82 See id. at 1038 (noting that petitioners “propose that but for the nurses the wife could
not leave her child; but for the freedom so secured she could not pursue her gainful labors;
and but for them there would be no income and no tax”).
83 Id. at 1038–39 (footnote omitted).
84 I thank Professor Edward J. McCaffrey for his lucid explanation of these logical flaws
when commenting on my article, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 9, during the
Loyola L.A. Tax Policy Colloquium (2015).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

19

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 6

1112

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1093

furnish a reason why its cost should be treated as an
offset in the guise of a deductible item.85
In this thought cloud, Judge Opper seemed to display a rather
unquestioned acceptance of the public/private sphere distinction
widely identified in feminist discourse. The Court made clear its
unexamined belief that the duties of men occupy the public sphere
(men’s duties are found within the external, paid workforce)
whereas the duties of women occupy the private sphere (their duties
consist of unpaid, household labor).86 Doubling down, Judge Opper
also seemed to convey a not so subtle disapproval of the mother who
seeks to expand her duties to the paid, public sphere, seeming to
insinuate that she’s shirked her more important duties within the
private one.87
What’s more, Judge Opper made no attempt to chase down the
quite basic, fundamental tax consequences of the circumscribed
spheres he insisted exist. Indeed, had he done so, he may have come
to the conclusion that principles of tax equity might necessitate a
deduction for childcare expenses. If the duties of the non-paying
private sphere are so disproportionately assigned to women when
compared to men, women must bear a heavier cost in entering the
paying, public sphere to earn income. A deduction for working
childcare costs would reflect the often-invoked (which is not to say
uncontroversial) notion that similarly situated taxpayers should be
taxed similarly.88
Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039.
See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1
AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 16–17 (1993); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REPORTER 175, 178
(1982) (discussing Justice Bradley’s concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141
(1873), where he noted the separate spheres ideology to conclude that the “paramount destiny
and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother”).
87 See Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039 (declaring that the wife’s services are unpaid, “as custodian
of the home and protector of its children”).
88 See, e.g., David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 43, 43 (2006) (“The principle of horizontal equity demands that similarly situated
individuals face similar tax burdens. It is universally accepted as one of the more significant
criteria of a ‘good tax.’ It is relied upon in discussions of the tax base, the tax unit, the
reporting period, and more.” (citations omitted)). This is not to say there is not controversy:
scholarly critique of the concept abounds. See generally Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity:
Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (1989) (criticizing the concept of
horizontal equity).
85
86
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Despite the lack of persuasive reasoning in the B.T.A.’s opinion,
the Second Circuit affirmed the B.T.A.’s pithy decision without
comment89 and, unsurprisingly, the IRS followed it. And so, while it
was at least theoretically possible that working childcare expenses
could have been interpreted to fall within the broad scope of
expenses deemed recoverable under §§ 162 and 212—allowing
taxpayers to deduct the ordinary and necessary costs of earning
income—it was not to be.
After Smith, Congress would begin its long wade into the
question of whether and to what extent parents could recover the
costs of childcare incurred while working. As the next part will
show, the cursory Smith decision foreshadowed themes that
recurred throughout early Congressional debates about how the
working mother should be taxed.
C. EARLY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AFTER SMITH

In 1954, the Internal Revenue Code was re-organized and
overhauled,90 representing one of several times that the entire Code
was re-codified. The subject of childcare expenses was debated
extensively.
Some lawmakers and organizations, including the American Bar
Association, American Institute of Accountants, and American
Nurses Association, viewed childcare costs as business expenses
and advocated that these costs, like many costs of earning income,
be deductible and not subject to income or dollar limitations.91
Representative Kenneth Roberts highlighted the inequity, asking
why the “government . . . allows a lawyer to deduct entertainment
89 Smith v. Comm’r, 113 F.2d 114, 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (affirming the B.T.A.’s decision
without comment).
90 See, e.g., T. Coleman Andrews, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, TAX EXEC., Oct.
1954, at x (1954) (“With the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Internal
Revenue Service was confronted with an unprecedented task. This legislation, the most
sweeping revision of the Federal tax laws in our Nation’s history, makes it necessary to
rewrite virtually all of our regulations and revise more than 200 forms used by taxpayers.”);
Roswell Magill & Henry W. de Kosmian, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Income,
Deductions, Gains and Losses, 68 HARV. L. REV. 201, 201–02 (1954); Jay A. Soled, Reforming
the Grantor Trust Rules, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 375, 388 (2001) (“In 1954, Congress
conducted a massive overhaul of the 1939 Code.”).
91 See Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 214 (discussing arguments in favor of allowing
an above-the-line deduction as a business expense, as opposed to being deducted below-theline, as itemized deductions).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

21

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 6

1114

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1093

fees lavished upon a prospective client” but “will not grant this
privilege to the working mother who toils . . . in the hope that her
children may have a better life.”92
But the answer Roberts (perhaps rhetorically) sought is not
really all that hard to discern—at least, not once one realizes the
peripheral role principles of tax equity were playing in these
debates. Rather than focusing on these fundamentals, the driving
debate in Congress centered on whether mothers “should” work
outside the home at all.93 Lawmakers seemed to generally agree
that single mothers and mothers of low means should receive tax
relief for the childcare costs they incurred to work, since economic
necessity required them to do so.94 But the debate over whether
relief should extend to those that chose to work was far more
contentious. Arguing that it should not, Representative Noah
Mason offered colorful contributions:
I am thinking of the thousands, if not millions, of
women who are married who have families who have
responsibilities but who prefer to neglect these
obligations and responsibilities in order to work and
earn money which they can spend upon themselves in
spite of the fact that their husbands are earning enough
for a pretty fair living.95
Mason also worried about women displacing male jobs: “Just at
present our employment is almost full capacity, but suppose we
have a slight depression and we have several million unemployed
men.”96 Should a married woman, Mason wondered, still “have the
right to her career as well as her married privileges?”97

92 Id. (quoting General Revenue Revision: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means
on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong.
63 (1953) (statement of Rep. Kenneth Roberts)).
93 See id. at 217 (noting that “the question of eligibility brought the legislative debate into
the realm of values and assumptions about family life”).
94 See id. at 217.
95 Id. at 218 (General Revenue Revision: Hearings before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means
on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong.
63 (1953) (statement of Rep. Noah Mason)).
96 Id.
97 Id.
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The sentiments of Congressmen like Mason moved Congress
away from the debate of whether working childcare expenses should
be viewed as costs of earning income. Instead, debates focused on
how to determine which women needed to work and which were
choosing to do so, so that relief could be limited to the former
group.98 Following the advice of the Eisenhower administration, the
proposed House Bill limited deductions to widowers (regardless of
gender), divorced women, and women with incapacitated spouses.99
The proposed Senate Bill modified these eligibility restrictions.100
The enacted law, which followed the Senate Bill,101 allowed single
mothers and “widowers” to claim deductions up to a $600 dollar
cap,102 a figure that estimated the median monthly cost of childcare
at the time ($50).103 But “working wives” could only claim the full
deduction if her income, when combined with her spouse’s, did not
exceed $4,500104—a figure which was about $300 higher than the
reported median income for all families and about 90% of the
reported median income of two-earner families in 1954.105 After this
point the deduction phased-out––that is, was reduced–– and was
lost completely when combined income reached $5,100106—about
$900 higher than the median income reported for all families and
slightly higher than the median income for two-earner families at
the time.107 Thus, the Code taxed single parents and widowers
rather equitably, regardless of whether they incurred childcare
expenses to work outside the home. It also did this for married
parents of low and moderate means. But by deliberate design, the

See id. at 217.
See id. at 219–20.
100 Id. at 220.
101 Id. at 220–22.
102 See I.R.C. § 214(b)(1)(A) (1954) (repealed 1976).
103 Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 219–20 (explaining that the $600 “figure [was]
based on the estimated median monthly cost of childcare, $50”).
104 I.R.C. § 214(b)(2)(B) (1954) (repealed 1976).
105 Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22 (estimating median income for all
families at $4,167 and for “two earners” at $5,000) See also CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS,
supra note 22, at 296 tbl.G 179–188 (estimating median income of all families in 1954 at
$4,173 and of families “with wife in paid labor force” at $5,336).
106 I.R.C. § 214(b)(2)(B) (1954) (repealed 1976).
107 Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22; see also CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 296 tbl.G 179–188 (estimating median income of all families in
1954 at $4,173 (total median income) and of families with “wife in paid labor force” at $5,336.).
98
99
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Code favored the one-breadwinner model for married families of
above-moderate means.
Considering the debates animating these laws, one might have,
in 1954, reasonably lamented that not much had changed since
Smith. Setting aside issues of tax equity, lawmakers held strong to
the public/private distinction, viewing with suspicion and scorn the
working mother who, in the words of Congressman Mason
“neglect[ed] [her] . . . responsibilities” to care for her children,108 or
in the words of Judge Opper “chose[] to employ others to discharge
her domestic function.”109 But the story of our childcare tax laws is
far from over.
II. THE CHILDCARE TAX LAW’S EVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
In the sixties, cultural attitudes about the role of women in the
American workplace started to change rapidly. The first part of this
section discusses some of the cultural influences and political
developments that catalyzed this shift. Despite these developments,
however, reforms to the childcare tax laws during this decade
remained modest, resulting in laws that continued to prefer the onebreadwinner model for married parents of above-moderate means.
However, as the second part of this section shows, during the
seventies and eighties, the childcare tax laws experienced a rapid
evolution. During this time, most parents were able to recover a
substantial portion of their childcare costs, resulting in more
equitable taxation of parenting models.
A. A BIT ABOUT THE SIXTIES: A LOT OF ACTIVISM, MODEST CHILDCARE
TAX REFORM

For many, the sixties bring to mind pictures of feminist activism.
The feminist movements110 are sometimes described as occurring in
108 Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 218 (quoting General Revenue Revision: Hearings
before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of
the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong. 37–41 (1953) (statement of Rep. Noah Mason)).
109 Smith v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1039 (1939).
110 I have referred to movements in the plural intentionally, reflecting the work of scholars
wishing to avoid the reductionist tendency to describe Second Wave feminism as one cohesive
movement. See, e.g., Sherna Berger Gluck et al., Whose Feminism, Whose History?: Reflections
on Excavating the History of (the) U.S. Women’s Movement(s), in COMMUNITY ACTIVISM AND
FEMINIST POLITICS: ORGANIZING ACROSS RACE, CLASS AND GENDER 31, 31 (Nancy A. Naples
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waves, though other scholars have forcefully argued that this
misrepresents the movements’ true nature which was more
continuous than this metaphor suggests.111 Those that employ the
metaphor most readily identify the first wave of feminism with the
fight for women’s suffrage and often mark its end in the 1920s when
the Nineteenth Amendment was passed.112
Beginning in the early 1960s and fizzling in the 1980s, many
popular accounts of Second Wave feminism113 have focused on
movements for women’s equality in the workplace, and women’s
empowerment and liberation more generally.114 Because this

ed., 1998) (“Referring to women’s movements in the plural . . . reflects a deepening awareness
of how the multitudinous forms of women’s activism throughout the world all work to
challenge patriarchal hierarchies.”); BENITA ROTH, SEPARATE ROADS TO FEMINISM: BLACK,
CHICANA AND WHITE FEMINIST MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA’S SECOND WAVE 1 (2004) (“What I
wish to do is develop a picture of second-wave feminisms, feminisms that were plural and
characterized by racial/ethnical organizational distinctiveness.”).
111 See, e.g., Nancy A. Hewitt, Introduction to NO PERMANENT WAVES: RECASTING
HISTORIES OF U.S. FEMINISM 1, 1 (2010) (explaining that the book “engages the ongoing
debates over the adequacy of the ‘wave’ metaphor for capturing the complex history of
women’s rights” and “offer[s] fresh perspectives on the diverse movements that constitute
U.S. feminism, past and present”); Barbara Molony & Jennifer Nelson, Introduction to
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND “SECOND WAVE” FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL HISTORIES 1, 3 (2017)
(“The wave metaphor has been both embraced and challenged by feminists outside North
America.”); Robyn Warhol, Second-Wave Feminism and After, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF POSTMODERN LITERATURE 230, 231 (Brian McHale & Len Platt eds., 2016) (stating that
“dividing the movement into ‘waves’ oversimplifies the internal debates within feminism in
each of its historical moments”); Verta Taylor, Social Movement Continuity: The Women’s
Movement in Abeyance, 54 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 761, 761 (1989) (“This article uses social
movement and organization theory to develop a set of concepts that help explain social
movement continuity. The theory is grounded in new data on women’s rights activism from
1945 to the 1960s that challenge the traditional view that the American women’s movement
died after the suffrage victory in 1920 and was reborn in the 1960s.”).
112 As with many other facets of feminist history, it has been forcefully argued that this
description is drastically oversimplified. See Taylor, supra note 111, at 761 (arguing that the
first wave did not end with the attainment of suffrage). See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE
GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM (1987) (arguing that once suffrage was attained, women
were politically active in many other ways that are often overlooked in many popular accounts
of “first wave” feminism).
113 This term appears to have been first used by Martha Weinman Lear in The Second
Feminist Wave, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 10, 1968, at 24.
114 See, e.g., Becky Thompson, Multiracial Feminism: Recasting the Chronology of Second
Wave Feminism, 28 FEMINIST STUDIES 337, 337 (2002) (expressing “increasing[] concern[]”
about “version[s] of Second Wave history that Chela Sandoval refers to as ‘hegemonic
feminism.’ This feminism is white led, marginalizes the activism and world views of women
of color, focuses mainly on the United States, and treats sexism as the ultimate oppression.
Hegemonic feminism deemphasizes or ignores a class and race analysis, generally sees
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popularly-portrayed movement tended to focus on the interests of
white educated women, it has been termed by some as “mainstream
white feminism”115 and by others as “hegemonic” feminism.116
In reality, there was far more to the feminist movements during
the so-called Second Wave and it is more accurate to view feminisms
as consisting of a series of movements with varied agendas that
focused on many different types of oppression.117 And a thorough
chronicle of what catalyzed and propelled feminisms in the 1960s–
1980s would identify varied and diverse agents, ranging from
leaders of the Black Power movement,118 to those in the LBGTQ
community,119 to a variety of other activist and minority groups.120
This Section will focus on what will be referred to, interchangeably,
as the mainstream or hegemonic movements because of their direct
relevance to this Article—the actors in these movements demanded

equality with men as the goal of feminism, and has an individual rights-based, rather than
justice-based vision for social change.”).
115 See, e.g. ROTH, supra note 110, at 1 (discussing how women of color formed feminist
movements that were “distinct from so-called mainstream white feminist groups.”).
116 The term appears to have been first used by Chela Sandoval, US Third-World
Feminism: The Theory and Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the Postmodern World,
in FEMINIST POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER 75, 75 (Reina Lewis & Sara Mills eds., 2003);
see also Thompson, supra note 114, at 337 (discussing Sandoval’s usage of the term); Berger
Gluck et al., supra note 110, at 31 (same).
117 Berger Gluck et al., supra note 110, at 31; Thompson, supra note 114, at 337.
118 See, e.g., SHERIE M. RANDOLPH, FLORYNCE “FLO” KENNEDY: THE LIFE OF A BLACK
FEMINIST RADICAL (2015). As one reviewer explained, “[m]ost scholarship on postwar feminist
organizing views black feminism as emerging largely in protest against exclusion by white
feminists or in opposition to black power’s sexism. While several histories briefly list Flo
Kennedy, they typically note her and other black feminists who worked in the movement as
exceptions and offer little examination of their influence on second-wave feminism.” Duchess
Harris, Florynce “Flo” Kennedy: The Life of a Black Feminist Radical, 103 J. AM. HISTORY
831, 831 (2016) (book review).
119 See, e.g., Clark A. Pomerleau, Empowering Members, Not Overpowering Them: The
National Organization for Women, Calls for Lesbian Inclusion, and California Influence,
1960s–1980s, 57 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 842, 842 (2010) (arguing that “[s]tandard accounts of the
National Organization for Women (NOW) seriously underplay the duration of tensions
between heterosexual and lesbian NOW members and the ways those tensions included both
racialized analogies and tactical concerns”).
120 See, e.g., ROTH, supra note 110, at 1; Amanda Hess, How a Fractious Women’s Movement
Came
to
Lead
the
Left,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/magazine/ how-a-fractious-womens-movement-cameto-lead-the-left.html.
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reform of the tax laws to reflect the cost of childcare for working
parents and had an apparent influence on their development.121
A discussion of the hegemonic movement’s inception frequently
includes Betty Friedan’s infamous book entitled The Feminine
Mystique, published in 1963.122 While the book has now been widely
criticized for its non-inclusivity, it is still credited as creating a
widespread awakening among some women—mainly white, upperclass women.123 Identifying the so-called “problem that has no
name,”124 Friedan’s book focused on the oppression felt by a certain
echelon of women who, despite being highly educated and capable,
had abandoned their aspirations of working in the public sphere for
a life of domesticity (often after they married and had children).125
Friedan encouraged her readers to question the patriarchal gender
norms that led them to this point.126
The election of John F. Kennedy, Jr. in 1960 is also cited as a
catalyst for hegemonic feminist movements.127 President Kennedy,
understanding the significant contribution the women’s vote made
to his successful election (and that he hoped would play in his reelection), formed the President’s Commission on the Status of
Women (the “Women’s Commission”), appointing Eleanor Roosevelt
as Chairwoman.128 In forming the Women’s Commission, President
Kennedy stated that “[w]omen should not be considered a marginal
group to be employed periodically only to be denied opportunity to
satisfy their needs and aspirations when unemployment rises or a

121 This focus is not meant to minimize the complexities of feminist history or the diversity
of issues pursued by the equally diverse actors that pursued feminist goals during this time
period. Nor does this focus reflect a judgment that the mainstream hegemonic movement was
more important, influential or significant than other movements.
122 BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963); see also Kira Cochrane, 1963: The
Beginning
of
the
Feminist
Movement,
THE GUARDIAN
(May
7,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2013/may/07/1963-beginning-feminist-movement
(“A US debate that had started tentatively with President John F Kennedy’s 1961 commission
on the status of women blew up with Friedan’s book . . . .”).
123 See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 96–99 (1984).
124 FRIEDAN, supra note 122, at 15.
125 Id. at 17–18.
126 Id. at 32 (“We can no longer ignore that voice within women that says: ‘I want something
more than my husband and my children and my home.’”).
127 Cochrane, supra note 122.
128 See John F. Kennedy, Statement by the President on the Establishment of the
President’s Commission on the Status of Women, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 799, 800 (Dec. 14, 1961)
[hereinafter Kennedy Statement].
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war ends.”129 In other words, he rejected the views of Congressmen
like Noah Mason who believed women should put their careers aside
and be satisfied with their “married privileges”130 when the economy
was sluggish. In so doing, Kennedy vowed that his Administration’s
policies would aim to “improve family incomes so that women
c[ould] make their own decisions” about whether to work outside the
home.131
In 1963, the Women’s Commission issued a nearly hundred-page
report, making recommendations in six key areas, one of which was
“Federal social insurance and tax laws as they affect . . . women.”132
At the time of the report, the maximum deduction for childcare
expenses was $600.133 This deduction was available to all singleparent families, but only available to dual-earner families earning
less than $5,100.134 But the Report explained, the median income
for dual-earner families had risen to over $7,100.135 As a result, “the
majority of working couples [had become] ineligible” to claim
deductions for childcare costs.136 The Women’s Commission
recommended that “[t]ax deductions for child care expenses of
working mothers . . . be kept commensurate with the median
income of couples when both husband and wife are engaged in
substantial employment.”137
The Kennedy Administration proposed that Congress adopt
changes that closely approximated the Women’s Commission’s
recommendations.138 Unhappiness that women were—and could
reasonably be expected to continue—entering the paid, public
workforce remained.139 For instance, the Women’s Commission’s
own Committee on Home and Community (perhaps unsurprisingly
Id. at 799.
Supra note 97 and accompanying text.
131 Kennedy Statement, supra note 128, at 799.
132 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN 7 (1963).
[hereinafter AMERICAN WOMEN].
133 See infra Section I.C. (discussing the legislative history behind the first childcare
deduction).
134 See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text.
135 AMERICAN WOMEN, supra note 132, at 21 (using figures from 1961 rather than from
1963, when the report was published).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 21–22.
138 Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 225.
139 Id. (noting that the Women’s Commission viewed women in the workforce primarily as
a matter of economic necessity).
129
130
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given its name) “express[ed] the belief that child care services
should be available and accessible to all women who choose to
work . . . [though] found it . . . ‘regrettable’ that women with very
young children sought employment.”140 But the rhetoric in Congress
had diversified since the fifties. Alongside these sentiments of
resignation were statements like those of Senator Maurine
Neuberger, who argued that all parents should be able to deduct
working childcare expenses to accord with basic principles of tax
equity, not to mention the just-passed Equal Pay Act.141
Congress’s initial response, however, fell short of those suggested
by the Women’s Commission. On one hand, Congress substantially
raised the maximum deduction available to families with multiple
children from $600 to $900 (though it did not adjust the $600 cap
for families with one child).142 That adjustment more than
compensated for inflation since 1954, when the caps were last
changed.143 And while data about childcare costs in 1964 is spotty,
one study estimated that full-time mothers typically spent about
Id. at 225.
Id. at 228 (citing 109 CONG. REC. 18,730–31) (describing Sen. Neuberger’s efforts to
raise the income ceiling of the deduction).
142 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 214(b)(1)(B), 78 Stat. 19, 49 (1964).
143 $900 in 1964 had the same buying power as about $784 in 1954 using this Article’s
methodology, described immediately below. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
(calculated as of January of each relevant year).
Inflation adjustments in this Article will be based on the average Consumer Price Index for
All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) published by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics. To make these adjustments, an inflation calculator available from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics was used. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra. Other tax scholars have
utilized this methodology for similar projects. See e.g. Tracy Roberts, Brackets: A Historical
Perspective, 108 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 925, 929 nn.8–11 (2015) (explaining and using
same methodology).. As Professor Roberts explains, until the passage of the TCJA, “Congress
ha[d], by statute, specifically authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to use the
CPI-U to index the income tax brackets for inflation” though it also “…authorize[d] other
indices for other inflation adjustments” Roberts at 1407, citing I.R.C. §§ 1(f)(5), 43(b)(3),
45(e)(2)(B). The TCJA “change[d] the measure used for inflation indexing, from the CPI-U to
the chained CPI-U.” See William G. Gale et.al., Effects Of The Tax Cuts And Jobs Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, TAX POLICY CENTER
4 (2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/ES_20180608_tcja_summary_paper_final.pdf.
(discussing
the
change and alleged reasons for it) Although this Author recognizes this change, the TCJA
had not been enacted when this article was originally written and, the CPI-U seems more
than sufficient for the general comparisons this article makes. For more on other methods of
inflation adjustment See e.g. Roberts, supra, at 929 n.11 (citing Jim Chen, The Price of
Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375,
1403–29 (2003).
140
141
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$16 per week on childcare services, or about $832 annually at that
time.144 This estimate would suggest that the 1964 dollar caps were
at least close to the average cost of childcare for full-time mothers
at that time.145
On the other hand, Congress’s adjustments to the childcare
deduction’s income phase-outs were tepid. As had been true, those
categorized as single parents—which now included a taxpayer that
was an unmarried “woman or widower, or [wa]s a husband whose
wife [wa]s incapacitated or [wa]s institutionalized”146—could still
claim the deduction regardless of means. The point at which the
deduction began to phase out for working wives—i.e. dual-earners—
was raised to $6,000,147 which was about 79% of the median income
for two-earner families in 1964, and about 91% of the median
income for all families.148 The deduction was lost entirely once
income exceeded $6,600 for one child or $6,900 for multiple
children.149 Using these data points, the income phase-outs in the
1964 childcare tax laws were arguably less generous than their 1954
144 See SHARON M. MCGRODER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A SYNTHESIS OF
RESEARCH ON CHILD CARE UTILIZATION PATTERNS 21 (1988), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/fil
es/pdf/74646/ccressyn.pdf [hereinafter MCGRODER, SYNTHESIS] (“In 1965, full-time mothers
spent, on average, about $54 per week on child care” (citing SETH LOW & PEARL G. SPINDLER,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE & U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHILD CARE
ARRANGEMENTS OF WORKING MOTHERS IN THE U.S. 107 tbl.A–48 (1968))). This figure was
reported in December 1984 dollars. MCGRODER, SYNTHESIS at 19 n.22. Thus, in January of
1964, the average cost would have represented about $16 weekly or $832 annually. See CPI
Inflation Calculator, supra note 143. The authors who reported the underlying data
estimated that most mothers paying for childcare at that time would have spent “between
$10 and $19 a week” on child care, or between $520 and $988 annually. LOW & SPINDLER,
supra, at 3.
145 See MCGRODER, SYNTHESIS, supra note 144, at 21 (listing the average weekly
expenditure on childcare); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL INSURANCE AND TAXES TO
THE CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 99 (1968) (“[T]he value of the
present deduction of $600 (or $900) is such a small part of the total cost of providing even a
minimum type of care that it gives little incentive to low-income mothers . . . to make
arrangements for paying someone to provide such care.”).
146 Revenue Act of 1964 § 212, (amending I.R.C. § 214(a)).
147 Id. (amending I.R.C. § 214(b)(2)). The same phase-outs applied to “a husband whose
wife is incapacitated.” Id.
148 Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22 (reporting median income in 1964 as
$6,569 for all families and $7,549 for two earner families); see CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 296 tbl.G 179–188 (estimating median income in 1964 for dualearner couples at $8,170 and for all families at $6,569).
149 § 212, 78 Stat. at 49. The deduction amount limits were, respectively, 81% and 85% of
the median income for dual-earners at the time, and about 100% of the median income for all
families at the time. See supra note 148.
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counterparts, which allowed a working wife to claim the maximum
deduction as long as her income did not exceed a threshold that was
about 90% of the median income of two-earner families in 1954150
and which did not phase-out completely until the family earned
roughly the median income for two-earners at the time.151
Thus, like their predecessors, the 1964 childcare tax laws
continued to tax dual-earner families of above-moderate means
inequitably compared to their one-breadwinner counterparts. But
the childcare tax laws were about to experience an evolution,
resulting in laws that taxed families with different childcare needs
more equitably than they had done before or have since.
B. THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES: THE CHILDCARE TAX LAW’S
EVOLUTION

Sympathetic lawmakers remained unsatisfied with the childcare
tax laws. Reflecting this, between 1964 and 1971, two authors
identified approximately 43 proposed bills that would have
liberalized these laws, including “15 bills to increase the amount of
the allowable deduction, 9 to raise the income ceiling . . . [and] 5 to
change childcare expenses from a personal to a business
deduction.”152
Beyond the halls of Congress, the public was starting to pay
attention to the childcare tax provisions too. In 1966, the National
Organization for Women (NOW) was co-founded by Betty
Friedan.153 The organization sought “true equality for all women” in
“truly equal partnership with men”154 and is widely remembered for
the activism and demonstrations that ensued during the
mainstream Second Wave movements’ flow. In its original Bill of
Rights, NOW demanded eight reforms it believed were essential for
American society to achieve women’s liberation and equality.155
Among them, NOW demanded “[i]mmediate revision of tax laws to
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 106& 107 and accompanying text.
152 Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 230.
153 Founding, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, http://now.org/about/history/founding-2/
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2019).
154 Betty Friedan, The National Organization for Women’s 1966 Statement of Purpose,
NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, http://now.org/about/history/statement-of-purpose/ (last accessed
Jan. 22, 2019).
155 See NOW Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 473–75.
150
151
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permit the deduction of home and child care expenses for working
parents.”156
NOW even organized demonstrations for this tax reform. In
1971, a recent widow by the name of Elizabeth Barrett argued in
the U.S. Tax Court that she had a constitutional right to deduct
childcare expenses she incurred while earning income for her
family.157 To support her case, NOW organized a “Baby Carriage
Brigade,” a demonstration in which women brought strollers to
protest what it viewed as a sexist tax code that allowed all sorts of
business expenses to be deducted but did not allow mothers to
recover the childcare expenses they needed to incur to participate
in the paid, public sphere.158 The demonstration’s slogan—“Are
Children As Important As Martinis?”159—poignantly captured a
central question of tax policy: Why shouldn’t working mothers be
able to deduct the costs of childcare while they are working in the
same way that other taxpayers are allowed to deduct many other
costs of earning income? Even the New York Times took interest,
running a story entitled “One Working Mother Against the I.R.S.”160
to cover Elizabeth Barrett’s case, which she lost.161
Demonstrations also found their way to congressional floors. In
one particularly colorful moment, a congressional committee
rejected a proposal to expand the number of working mothers who
could deduct childcare costs on the same day it passed a tax break
for oil companies.162 One Representative who had supported the
proposal arranged for two of his staffer’s children to appear in oil
well costumes in the committee room, mordantly suggesting that
children needed to look like oil wells to receive proper attention.163

Id. at 474.
See Nammack v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 1379, 1379–82 (1971), aff’d mem. 459 F.2d 1045 (2d
Cir. 1972). The case refers to Ms. Barrett by her married name, Nammack.
158 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
160 Lisa Hammell, One Working Mother Versus the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
1971), http://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/20/archives/one-working-mother-versus-theirs.html.
161 Nammack, 56 T.C. at 1385.
162 See Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 248–49.
163 See id.
156
157
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As the sixties turned into the seventies, the participation of white
married women in the labor force continued to rise.164 African
American and other minority women had long worked outside the
home,165 but it was the movement of white married women into the
external workforce that seemed to finally attract the notice of
lawmakers when it came to the childcare tax laws. The 1970s
witnessed dramatic changes to these laws.
The 1971 childcare tax laws shed the gendered language used by
their predecessors, granting the deduction to any “individual who
maintains a household which includes as a member one or more
qualifying individuals,” such as children younger than fifteen years
of age and certain other physically-incapable dependents.166 In
doing so, the tax laws eliminated the distinction between single
parents (e.g. unmarried women and widowers) and dual-earners
(e.g. working wives), which had previously existed. Thus, the same
dollar limitations and income phase-outs applied to all families,
even single parents to which phase-outs had not previously applied.
At the same time, Congress tripled the income beyond which the
phase out would begin to $18,000167—an amount that represented
more than 150% of the median income for both two-earner and all
American families at the time168 and over $109,000 in 2017 adjusted
dollars.169 Once a taxpayer’s income exceeded that threshold, the
164 Chinhui Juhn & Simon Potter, Changes in Labor Force Participation in the United
States, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2006, at 27, 34 (“Thus, the dramatic rise in female
participation that occurred during the 1970s and the 1980s was largely due to changing
behavior among married white women with children—women who in 1970 were most likely
to be part of a ‘traditional’ household with the husband as wage earner and the wife as the
homemaker.”).
165 See id. at 33–34 & tbl.2; see also LANDRY, supra note 12, at 79–81.
166 Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210, 85 Stat. 497, 518 (1971). Congress also
expanded the types of expenses that could be deducted to include other “household services.”
Id.
167 Id.
168 Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22 (reporting the median for all families at
$10,285 and $11,741 for two earners); see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME P60-083, NUMBER OF FAMILIES AND UNRELATED
INDIVIDUALS BY TOTAL MONEY INCOME IN 1971 1 tbl.A (1972) (reporting $10,290 median
income for all families). For dual-earners, it was reported that the 1970 median income was
$23,746 in 1980 dollars. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1982–83, 436 tbl.720 (1982). That amount would be the rough equivalent $11,537 in
1970 dollars. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January of each
relevant year).
169 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
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deduction was phased down.170 The laws, somewhat oddly,
differentiated between in-home and out-of-home care. For in-home
care, the deduction was lost completely once a family earned
$27,600171 (close to $170,000 in 2017 adjusted dollars).172 For
taxpayers utilizing out-of-home care, the deduction was lost
completely once income exceeded $22,800, $25,200, and $27,600 for
one, two and three or more children, respectively173 (or about
$140,000, $154,000 and $170,000 in 2017 adjusted dollars).174 Most
of these amounts were more than double the median income for all
American and two-earner families in 1971.175
Congress also raised the maximum allowable deduction
significantly. Eligible families could deduct up to $4,800 in expenses
for in-home care, an eight-fold increase from previous dollar caps,176
which is equivalent to nearly $30,000 in 2017 adjusted dollars.177
Families utilizing providers outside of their homes (e.g. day care)
could deduct up to $2,400, $3,600, and $4,800 for one, two and three
or more children, respectively.178 While reliable data about childcare
170 § 210, 85 Stat. at 518–19 (amending I.R.C. § 214(d) to read, “If the adjusted gross income
of the taxpayer exceeds $18,000 for the taxable year during which the expenses are incurred,
the amount of the employment-related expenses incurred during any month of such year
which may be taken into account under this section shall (after the application of sub-sections
(e)(5) and (c)) be further reduced by that portion of one-half of the excess of the adjusted gross
income over $18,000 which is properly allocable to such month. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, if the taxpayer is married during any period of the taxable year, there shall be taken
into account the combined adjusted gross income of the taxpayer and his spouse for such
period.”).
171 See id. (amending I.R.C. § 214(c)(1) & (2)(A) to cap the deduction at $400 per month—
or $4,800 annually—for in-home expenses). Thus, under amended I.R.C. § 214(d), the
deduction was completely lost once a taxpayer’s income exceeded $27,600 (half of the
difference between $27,600 and $18,000 equals $4,800).
172 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
173 See § 210, 85 Stat. at 518–19. The phasedown in amended § 214(d) would have
completely eliminated the deduction at the identified income levels (calculated using the
same method described supra note 172).
174 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
175 Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22; see supra note 168.
176 Compare § 210, 85 Stat. at 518 (amending I.R.C. § 214(c)(1) to allow deduction of up to
$4,800 per year for in-home care) with Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212, 78
Stat. 19, 49 (1964) (amending I.R.C. § 214(b)(1) to allow a yearly deduction of up to $600 for
one child or $900 for multiple children).
177 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January of each relevant
year).
178 See § 210, 85 Stat. at 518 (creating limits of $200, $300 and $400 a month under I.R.C.
§ 214(c)(2)(B) for care provided outside of the taxpayer’s home to one, two and three or more
children, respectively).
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costs remains difficult to find during this time period, this cap
represents about $14,650, $22,000 and $30,000 in 2017 adjusted
dollars, which would seem to have quite soundly covered the cost of
annual care for most families.179
Congress adjusted the income-phase outs even further in 1975,
granting the full deduction to taxpayers whose income did not
exceed $35,000180—more than double the median income for twoearner families reported at the time181 and an amount that was
about $163,000 in 2017.182 The deduction phased out completely at
higher income levels. For in-home care, the deduction was totally
lost once income exceeded $44,600,183 which was about $208,000 in
2017.184 It phased out completely for out-of-home care for one, two
and three or more children once income exceeded $39,800, $42,200
and $44,600, respectively185 (or $185,500, $197,000 and $208,000 in
2017 adjusted dollars, respectively).186 These amounts represented
well over 200% of the reported median income for two-earner
families in 1975.187
These changes greatly increased the number of households
eligible to deduct childcare expenses. And generous dollar caps
allowed these families to recover most—if not all—of their annual
expenses. But there was, for liberal lawmakers, another pressing

179 See MCGRODER, SYNTHESIS, supra note 144, at 19 n.22, 21 (finding that “[b]y 1975, [fulltime mothers’] average [childcare] cost was $46” weekly, or approximately $2,400 annually,
in December 1984 dollars). In January 1965 dollars, that figure would have been about $14
weekly, or $728 annually. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143. In January 2017
dollars, it would have been about $106 weekly, or $5,512 annually. See id.
180 Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–12, § 206, 89 Stat. 26, 32 (1975). See Table
F-12, supra note 22, median income for two earners $16,058 in 1975 dollars.
181 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME P60101, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
1975 AND 1974 REVISIONS 9 tbl.1 (1976) (median income in 1975 for dual-earner couples was
approximately $17,237).
182 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
183 I.R.C. § 214(d) (1975) (repealed 1976) (reducing the allowable deduction by one half of
adjusted gross income exceeding $35,000). Because the maximum deduction was $400 per
month, or $4,800 annually, see id., § 214(c)(1), a family earning $9,600 more than the income
cap of $44,600 would earn enough to phase out the deduction completely.
184 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
185 See I.R.C. § 214(c)(2) (1975) (repealed 1976). The phase out would thus eliminate the
deduction for families earning $4,800, $7,200, or $9,600 more than the annual income cap,
depending on the number of children. See id. § 214(d).
186 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
187 See supra note 181.
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problem. The childcare tax laws provided relief as a so-called
itemized (“below-the-line”) deduction. In general, taxpayers may
choose to deduct either the aggregate of their itemized deductions
or a pre-designated standard deduction. Because families in lower
income classes are far more likely to use the standard deduction,188
lawmakers were concerned that they were not benefitting from the
newly liberalized childcare tax laws.189
This problem could have been solved directly and cleanly by
moving the deduction “above-the-line”—or, more formally, by
allowing the deduction to reduce a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.
Unlike itemized deductions, above-the-line deductions can be
claimed by all taxpayers with sufficient income to absorb them. And
taxpayers can claim above-the-line deductions even when they also
claim either below-the-line or the standard deductions. But this
suggestion made less sympathetic policymakers queasy.190 Abovethe-line deductions are often associated with costs of earning
income. And those policymakers did not want to put childcare
expenses on par with those costs.191 Thus, efforts to move the
childcare deduction from below- to above-the-line repeatedly failed.
Congresspersons advocating for the change conceived a clever
workaround that would, mathematically, achieve something close
to the desired result—i.e. allowing families that claimed the
standard deduction to benefit from the childcare tax laws—while
settling the stomachs of lawmakers who did not want working
childcare expenses to fall above-the-line with other business
expenses.192 These lawmakers proposed to change the itemized
childcare deduction to a percentage dollar-for-dollar credit so that
all taxpayers with sufficient tax liability could claim relief.193
Here is how it would work. Suppose that a taxpayer is able to
claim a deduction of $100, allowing her to reduce her taxable income
188 See, e.g., SEAN LOWRY, R43012, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ITEMIZED TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR
INDIVIDUALS: DATA ANALYSIS 2–3 (2014) (finding that of the 32% of filers that choose to
itemize, a higher percentage of high-income filers itemize compared to lower-income filers).
189 Nelson & Warring, supra note 19, at 243–44.
190 Id. at 244.
191 I have argued that taxpayers should be able to deduct childcare costs above-the-line
elsewhere. See generally Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 9.
192 See S. REP. NO. 94-938 at 14 (1976) (“The amendment converts the deduction into a 20percent credit, so that it will be available to those who use the standard deduction as well as
to itemizers . . . .”).
193 See id.
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by that amount. The tax savings she will enjoy from this deduction
depends on her marginal tax bracket, which is the rate at which an
additional dollar of her income will be taxed. If she is in a 30%
marginal tax bracket, she will save $30 in taxes from the
hypothetical $100 deduction. If she is in a 20% marginal tax
bracket, she will save $20, and so on.
Credits work differently. Rather than reducing one’s taxable
income, credits reduce one’s actual tax liability dollar-for-dollar.
After one has applied applicable rates to her taxable income, credits
reduce the final liability amount. Thus, a credit of $100 results in
$100 of tax savings. Lawmakers proposed to make the itemized,
childcare tax deduction a percentage credit to approximate the
value of the deduction while also allowing families that did not
itemize to benefit.194 For instance, a 30% credit of $100 would be
mathematically equivalent to a $100 deduction for a taxpayer in a
30% marginal tax bracket.
The idea had legs. In 1976 Congress passed a new law that
changed the childcare deduction to a percentage credit195 and
eliminated income limitations altogether. Specifically, Congress
allowed all working parents (single or married) to claim a 20% credit
regardless of whether they itemized and regardless of means.196 At
the same time, dollar limitations were adjusted. And the dubious
distinction between in-home and out-of-home care was eliminated.
Under the new law, qualifying taxpayers could claim the percentage
credit of up to $2,000 of expenses for one child and $4,000 of
expenses for multiple children.197 This was less than the dollar caps
of its 1971 and 1975 counterparts (even in non-adjusted dollars).198

194 See id. at 132 (“One method for extending the allowance of child care expenses to all
taxpayers, and not just to itemizers, would be to replace the itemized deduction with a credit
against income tax liability for a percentage of qualified expenses.”).
195 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504, 90 Stat. 1520, 1563–65 (1976)
(establishing dependent care credit, codified at I.R.C. § 44A (1976), and repealing I.R.C.
§ 214).
196 See I.R.C. § 44A (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 21 (2012)) (“In the case of an
individual who maintains a household which includes as a member one or more qualifying
individuals . . . there shall be allowed as a credit . . . an amount equal to 20 percent of the
employment-related expenses . . . .”).
197 Id. § 44A(d).
198 For comparison, $2,000 in 1976 would have been worth the same as about $1,900 in
1975 and $1,400 in 1971, while $4,000 would have been worth about $3,700 and $2,900,
respectively. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January of each
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Nevertheless, these amounts represent nearly $8,740 and $17,470
in 2017 adjusted dollars,199 close to triple the caps applicable to
today’s childcare tax credit.
In sum, the changes made to the childcare tax laws in 1976 were
significant. First, the clever workaround—the percentage credit—
ensured that all taxpayers, regardless of whether they itemized
their deductions, could benefit. Second, by eliminating income
limitations, these laws provided aid not only to those mothers that
needed to work, but also to those that chose to work. Third,
Congress explicitly rejected phase-outs, expressing its belief that
working childcare expenses were “cost[s] of earning income” and
thus not the type of expenses that should be based on income
level.200 This is probably the closest the Code has ever come to
treating working childcare expenses like other costs of earning
income. And in doing so, it drastically reduced the inequities
produced by previous childcare tax laws.
In 1981, Congress made two notable changes to the childcare tax
credit. First, Congress increased the percentage credit available for
families of lower incomes. Families earning less than $10,000,201
which was about 45% of the reported median income for all families
at the time, and about 37% of the reported median income for twoearner families,202 could claim a credit of 30% of their childcare
expenses, up from 20%.203 After a family earned more than $10,000,
the percentage was reduced.204 Families earning more than
relevant year). In 1971 and 1975, however, the expense cap was $4,800. See supra notes 173–
193 and accompanying text.
199 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
200 See S. REP. NO. 94-938 at 133 (1976) (“The committee views qualified child care expenses
as a cost of earning income and believes that an income ceiling on those entitled to the
allowance has minimal revenue impact, if the allowance is in the form of a credit. Therefore,
it considers it appropriate and feasible to eliminate the income phaseout and to allow all
taxpayers to claim such expenses regardless of their income level.”).
201 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 124(a), 95 Stat. 172, 197–
98 (1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 44A (1982)).
202 See Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22 (noting that 22,388 was the median
income for all families and 26,860 for two earner families); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ,
supra note 61, tbl.H-12 (reporting 1981 median income for all households as $19,074); U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME P60-137, MONEY
INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1981, 2 tbl.A (1983)
(reporting that dual-earner families in 1981 earned a median of about $26,860).
203 See I.R.C. § 44A(a) (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 21 (2012)) (“[T]he term ‘applicable
percentage’ means 30 percent reduced. . . .”).
204 See id.; I.R.C. § 44A(a) (1976).
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$30,000—more than 134% of the median income for all families and
about 112% of median income for two-earners families,205 and about
$84,000 in 2017 adjusted dollars206—could claim a 20% credit, as
they could have under prior laws. At the time, these changes
allowed an increased credit for lower-income families while leaving
the 20% credit for relatively wealthier taxpayers intact. But as just
discussed, Congress had rejected income phase-downs just six years
previously, reasoning that childcare costs were expenses of earning
income that should be recoverable by taxpayers regardless of their
means.207
Second, Congress raised the dollar limitations on the childcare
credit to $2,400 (up from $2,000) and $4,800 (up from $4,000) of
childcare expenses for one child and multiple children,
respectively.208 The increase did not fully reflect inflation over the
preceding six years.209 But when adjusted to 2017 dollars, the
increase was still worth about $6,700 and $13,400, over double
current dollar caps.210
In 1981, Congress also added another provision to the Code that
helped working families bear the costs of childcare.211 The first
version of the new § 129 allowed taxpayers to exclude from their
taxable income the value of employer-provided childcare benefits,
such as on-site daycare.212 Section 129 was originally enacted to
encourage employers to establish such facilities.213 But benefits
See supra note 202.
See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
207 See supra note 200.
208 Compare I.R.C. § 44A(d) (1982) with I.R.C. § 44A(d) (1976).
209 In 1981 dollars, the equivalent of the $2,000 and $4,000 caps in place in 1976 would
have been over $3,000 and $6,000, respectively. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143
(calculated as of January of each relevant year).
210 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017). The cap
presently in force is $3,000 for one child and $6,000 for two or more children. I.R.C. § 21(c)
(2012).
211 See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §124(e), 95 Stat. 172, 198–
201 (1981) (codified as I.R.C. § 129 (1982)); see also Erin L. Kelly, The Strange History of
Employer-Sponsored Child Care: Interested Actors, Uncertainty, and the Transformation of
Law in Organizational Fields, 109 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 606, 617–18 (2003).
212 See I.R.C. § 129(a), (d) (1982).
213 See Kelly, supra note 211, at 608 (“The 1981 tax law that eventually led to the
establishment of dependent care expense accounts actually was intended by its congressional
advocates to encourage employers to create new child care centers.”); Ron Lieber, Dependent
Care Accounts, Hamstrung by Limits, Are Still Worth Exploring, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/your-money/taxes/dependent-care-accounts205
206
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consultants quickly used their creativity to expand the scope of §
129. This expansion allowed employees to divert a portion of their
salaries to so-called Dependent Care Account Plans, or DCAP plans,
established by their employer free of tax.214
Congress approved of this expansion through a 1986 statutory
amendment, allowing working parents to put pre-tax income into
qualifying accounts, which could be used to pay for needed
childcare.215 At the same time, Congress set the dollar limit for the
exclusion at $5,000,216 which represents over $11,000 in 2017
adjusted dollars.217 Thus, an employee could claim the exclusion if
her employer provided in-kind childcare services or if she (the
employee) diverted a portion of her salary to an employer-provided
DCAP plan. There were now two childcare tax benefits. Families
could claim what was worth most to them, but they could not
double-up.218
Thus, as the eighties moved towards the nineties, the Code
allowed most families to recover a relatively substantial portion of
their childcare costs. The story of how the United States went from
having these fairly liberal childcare tax laws to the restrictive,
present day laws is superficially straightforward: Congress
basically did nothing with the laws for the last three-plus decades.
The next section of this Article explores this (d)evolutionary period
in depth.
III. DECADES OF STAGNATION: THE CHILDCARE TAX LAW’S

hamstrung-by-a-28-year-old-limit-are-still-worth-exploring.html
(“Congress
laid
the
groundwork for the dependent care accounts in 1981, though it didn’t actually mean to do so.
As Erin L. Kelly, a sociology professor at the University of Minnesota, chronicled . . .,
legislators were actually trying to encourage employers to start on-site day care centers or
directly subsidize workers’ child care costs.”).
214 See supra Part I.C; Kelly, supra note 211, at 608–09 (“Benefits consultants creatively
linked dependent care expense accounts to another new program they were trying to market,
‘cafeteria plans’ or flexible benefits programs.”).
215 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1151(f), 100 Stat. 2085, 2506 (1986)
(amending I.R.C. § 129(d) to accommodate “benefits provided through a salary reduction
agreement”).
216 § 1163, 100 Stat. at 2510 (capping the amount of exclusion permitted under I.R.C.
§ 129(a)(2)).
217 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of 2017).
218 I.R.C. § 129(e)(7) (1982) (disallowing other deductions or credits “for any amount
excluded from . . . gross income . . . by reason of this section”).
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(D)EVOLUTIONARY PERIOD
This section explores the childcare tax laws’ (d)evolutionary
period in three parts. The first part shows that while lawmakers
have submitted hundreds of proposals to increase childcare tax
benefits since the mid-eighties, Congress has failed to adjust these
benefits even for inflation, keeping them nominally static. But since
childcare costs have risen at least as fast as inflation, these benefits
have steadily lost real value.
The second part of this section focuses on other parental tax
reforms made since the mid-eighties but before the TCJA took
effect. These reforms resulted in a significant shift in the way the
Code taxes parents. Rather than adjusting childcare tax benefits
during these decades, Congress instead enacted new and expanded
existing parental tax benefits, none of which depended on whether
or to what extent childcare expenses were incurred to work outside
the home. Thus, while the reforms discussed in the previous section
reduced the inequitable taxation of similarly situated families with
different childcare needs, the reforms that occurred after the mideighties restored and perpetuated these inequities.
The third part tracks the changes made by the TCJA, revealing
that Congress tread the same well-worn path it has used since the
mid-eighties. By leaving the childcare tax laws untouched, the
TCJA ensured that childcare tax benefits will continue to erode,
allowing the inequitable taxation of families with different childcare
needs to worsen.
A. THE EROSION OF CHILDCARE TAX BENEFITS: INACTION IS ACTION

Since § 129 was enacted, Congress has never changed the
maximum exclusion available ($5,000).219 The cap has not been
indexed for inflation in over three decades, despite the fact that
childcare costs are certainly rising with (and perhaps faster than)
inflation.

219 See Lieber, supra note 219 (“But the dependent care account that employers offer
alongside the health one, the one that goes toward child care and other expenses? Next year,
the contribution limit will stay at $5,000, right where it was in 2014. And 2013. And every
single year since Congress set the original limit in 1986.”).
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Since 1981, the childcare credit’s dollar caps and income phasedowns have changed exactly once. In 2001—twenty years after the
last change—Congress allowed families to take a percentage credit
of childcare expenses up to $3,000 (up from $2,400) for one child and
$6,000 (up from $4,800) for multiple children.220 This adjustment
did not even fully reflect inflation between 1981 and 2001.221 It
remains at this level today, untouched by the TCJA.
In 2001, Congress also modified the percentage credit
mechanism. Since 1981, families earning less than $10,000 could
claim a maximum 30% credit, and the percentage phased down to a
minimum of 20% as income increased.222 The 2001 laws allowed
families earning less than $15,000, about 30% of the reported
median income for all families in 2001,223 to credit 35% of their
childcare expenses.224 The credit phased down to the 20% floor once
income reached $43,000,225 which was about 84% of the median
income reported for all families in 2001.226 These thresholds have
not been changed in the eighteen years since and were left
untouched by the TCJA.
A tabular representation of some of the most critical moments in
the chronology provided in this and the preceding section helps
make comparisons:

220 Compare Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–
16, § 204(a), 115 Stat. 38, 49 (2001) (amending I.R.C. § 21(c) (2000)) with I.R.C. § 44A(d)
(1982).
221 The value of $2,400 in 1981 is equivalent to over $4,800 in 2001, and the value of $4,800
in 1981 is equivalent to over $9,600 in 2001. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143
(calculated as of January of each relevant year).
222 See I.R.C. § 44A(a) (1982).
223 See Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22 (noting that median income for all
families was $51,407), By contrast, the 2001 median household income in the United States
was $42,228. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME
P60-218,
MONEY
INCOME
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES:
2001
1
(2002),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-218.pdf.
224 § 204(b), 115 Stat. at 49 (amending I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2000)).
225 See I.R.C. § 21(a) (2012).
226 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 223, at 1.
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1954227
Deduction

1964228
Deduction

1976229
20% credit

Dollar Cap
(in 2017
adjusted
dollars)232
One/Multiple
Children
Phaseout/
down?

$5,400/ N/A

$4,700/
$7,100

$8,700/
$17,500

Phase out

Phase out

None

Phaseout/down
starting
point
(% median
income twoearners/all
families at
time, F-12) 233
Phase-out
complete
(% median
income twoearners/all
families at
time)

Single/
widowed:
N/A

Single/
widowed:
N/A

N/A

Twoearners:

Twoearners:

Mechanism

90%/ 108%

1135

1981230
30% - 20%
credit
$6,700/
$13,400

2016231
35% - 20%
credit
$3100/
$6,200

30% phase
down
to
20%

35% phase
down
to
20%

37%/45%

15%/21%

N/A

20% once
over 112%/
134%

20%
over
59%

79%/91%

Single/
widowed:
N/A

Single/
widowed:
N/A

Twoearners:

Twoearners:

~102%/
122%

87-91%/
100%- 105%

once
44%/

Other
mechanisms

N/A

N/A

N/A

Exclusion
for in kind

Exclusion
for in kind
and FSA

Section 129
Dollar cap

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
(earned
income
limitation)

$5,100
regardless
of number
of children

As this table shows, recent childcare tax laws contain dollar
ceilings that are lower than they have been at many points in
history (once dollars are adjusted to an approximate constant

See supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 211–215 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text.
232 Adjusted using CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143, as of January 2017. The
numbers in this table are rounded to the nearest $100 in order to make general comparisons.
233 See Census Historical Income Tables, supra note 22.
227
228
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value).234 The next question is how the actual tax relief available to
working parents has changed. A full modeling is beyond the scope
of this Article, but even a few general observations provide
interesting insights.
For instance, consider the childcare tax benefits available to
families in 1976 compared to more recent laws. As discussed, in
1976, the childcare tax laws provided a fixed percentage (20%)
credit and benefits did not depend on income.235 All families could
therefore claim a credit worth roughly $1,750 for one child and
$3,500 for multiple children in 2017 adjusted dollars.236 But more
recent versions of, the credit do depend on income and allow
taxpayers in the lowest income brackets to claim a maximum (35%)
credit equal to $1,050 for one child and $2,100 for multiple
children.237 Thus, the poorest taxpayers able to claim childcare tax
benefits are likely entitled to less relief under recent laws than their
counterparts were in 1976 (once approximate inflation adjustments
are made).238
Turning to a comparison of the wealthiest parents, the bottom of
the phase-down range of recent versions of the childcare tax credit
hits quickly (as discussed at length above).239 Families that earn
more than $43,000 may claim a maximum credit of $600 for one
child and $1,200 for multiple children.240 But some taxpayers may
also be eligible to claim § 129’s $5,000 exclusion for amounts
diverted into Dependent Care Flexible Spending Accounts, an
option that was not available until 1986.241 The tax benefit to which
During the critical junctures explored in the previous parts and tabulated above, only
one exception appears—the dollar cap applicable in 2016 for Section 21 for multiple children
is worth more than it was in 1954, in constant dollars. This is likely due to the fact that the
1954 laws failed to differentiate by number of children, so that the dollar cap for multiple
children under current Section 21 is $6,000 ($6,200 in adjusted dollars) whereas the 1954
laws allowed a maximum of about $5,400 2017 dollars for any number of children. I.R.C. §
21(c)(2) (2012).
235
See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
236
See supra notes 196–199 and accompanying text.
237
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. This analysis would not change under TCJA’s
new rates because the credit does not depend on marginal tax rate. This analysis does assume
poorest taxpayers will claim the credit, as it will generally produce more benefit than the
exclusion because of their low marginal tax bracket (10% in both 2016 and 2018).
238
Id.
239
See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
240
See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
241
See supra note 58.
234
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any particular family is entitled under § 129 depends on the family’s
marginal tax bracket. Those earning enough income to find
themselves in the top marginal tax bracket in 2016242 could enjoy a
maximum benefit from the childcare tax laws of $1,980 for one child
and $2,180 for multiple children.243 Thus, the maximum benefits
wealthy families with one child could claim in 2016 were likely to
be slightly greater than the benefits their counterparts could claim
in 1976 (once adjusted to constant dollars). But these families would
likely benefit significantly less if care for multiple children was
required.244 These figures will be altered somewhat in 2018 because
the TCJA lowered the top marginal tax bracket to 37%, but the
general pattern is likely to remain the same.245
Moving beyond the highest and lowest earners, how do families
closer to the median incomes fare under recent childcare tax laws
compared with their 1976 counterparts? Suppose a couple that was
married and filing jointly earned the median income for all families
in 2016––$72,707––and that they claimed the applicable standard
deduction ($12,600) and three or four personal exemptions ($12,150
or $16,200)246 for themselves and one or two dependent children.
Their marginal tax rate would have been 15%. As a result, if they
had two children they would have benefitted more from the
childcare tax credit because their marginal tax bracket (15%) was
not high enough to make the exclusion (that provides savings of
$750 for them) more valuable than the $1,200 maximum credit.247
However, if this median earning couple had only one child in 2016,
they would have benefitted more from the exclusion, which would
have still provided a maximum $750 savings (since the exclusion
does not depend on number of children), compared to the $600
maximum savings offered by the credit (which does).
The analysis for married parents earning around the same
income will change somewhat in 2018 due to changes made by the
Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615 tbl.1 (promulgating 2016 tax rates). The top rate
hit at $467,000 if married filing jointly.
243
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
244
See id. See table below for exact comparisons in 2017 adjusted dollars.
245
In 2018, the maximum relief at the top bracket (now 37%) would be $1,850 and $2,050
for one and multiple children (and slightly less in 2017 adjusted dollars).
to $1,800 and $3,600 (adjusted dollars) in 1976. .
246
See supra note 61.
247
See supra notes 66 & Error! Bookmark not defined..
242
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TCJA.
Once income is reduced by the now-doubled standard
deduction ($24,000), the marginal tax rate of parents earning
around the median income may often fall to 12%. When this is the
case, the family with multiple children should still claim the $1,200
credit (as the maximum exclusion will be worth even less than it
was in 2016, when their marginal tax bracket was 15%). However,
in 2018, the family with one child may now be indifferent between
the exclusion and credit, as both offer a maximum $600 savings
(when marginal tax bracket it 12%).
In 2016, the situation of single parents earning the median
income for all families ($72,707) and who claim head of household
status is interesting because their taxable income may fall close to
the point where the 15% and 25% brackets “break,” If the head of
household claimed the standard deduction ($9,300) and two
personal exemptions ($8,100) for her and one dependent child, she
would likely maximize benefits by relying heavily on the exclusion
since most of it would reduce income that would otherwise be taxed
at 25%. Her maximum savings is likely around $1,240.248
A head of household with two children, however, may find herself
more squarely “between brackets” in 2016, and might maximize
benefits by claiming a combination of the exclusion (until the
income that is taxed at 25% is reduced) and the credit (for the
remaining income). This would have allowed her to claim a
maximum benefit that is roughly the same as the head of household
with one child.249 In 2018, this analysis may be different due to rate
changes and the repealed personal exemption.
Similar comparisons could be made between the childcare tax
benefits available to families in 1981 compared to more recent laws.
Recall that by 1981 the childcare tax credit phased-down by income.
And while the dependent care exclusion was enacted that year, it
only allowed for the exclusion of in-kind benefits and not for the

Around $100 of the $5000 exclusion will reduce income in the 15% bracket.
The 25% and 15% rates break at $50,400. After $72,707 income is reduced by the
standard deduction and three personal exemption amounts, taxable income is $51,257. She
might claim a $857 exclusion to reduce her 25% bracket income, resulting in a savings of
$214. The remaining $5,143 ($6,000 maximum less $857 claimed) could be claimed as a
20% credit ($1,028) for about $1,242 savings. It may be unlikely the average taxpayer
thinks to do this. If she just claims the credit, her tax savings will be $1,200, also close to
the savings a single mother with one child might claim if she claimed an exclusion that
mostly reduced 25% bracket income.
248
249
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exclusion of income diverted into an FSA (which was allowed in
1986 by statutory amendment.250) In 1981, the maximum credit
available to taxpayers earning under $10,000, (about 45% of the
median for all families at the time)251 was worth about $2,010 for
one child and $4,020 for multiple children in 2017 dollars.252 At the
bottom of the phase-down range, the maximum credit available in
1981 was $1,340 for one child and $2,680 for multiple children in
approximate 2017 dollars.253 And unlike today, taxpayers earning
the median family income in 1981254 would not have hit the end of
the phase out range and would have been entitled to a 23% credit255
worth, in 2017 dollars, about $1,540 for one child and $3,080 for
multiple children.256
A tabular summary of approximate maximum childcare tax
benefits available to parents of different filing statuses and earning
varying levels of income in 1976, 1981 and 2016 follows. Numbers
are expressed for one child and two children, respectively, and are
adjusted to approximate 2017 dollars.257

See supra notes 211–215.
See supra note 202 and accompanying text. Cross cite F-18 chart, (median income for
all was $22,388).
252
See I.R.C. § 44A(a), (d) (1982) (stating that the maximum credit was 30% of $2,400 for
one child or $4,800 for multiple children, which equates to $720 or $1,440 in 1981 dollars). In
2017 dollars, these amounts are approximately $2,010 and $4,020. See CPI Inflation
Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January of each relevant year).
253
See I.R.C. § 44A(a), (d) (1982) (restricting the maximum phased-down credit to 20% of
$2,400 for one child or $4,800 for multiple children, which equates to $480 or $960 in 1981
dollars). Thus, in 2017 dollars, the phased-down credits would be approximately $1,340 and
$2,680, respectively. See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January
of each relevant year).
254
Table F-12, supra note 22. The 1981 median income for all families was $22,388. See
supra note 202.
255
Assuming the family also had AGI of $22,388. See I.R.C. § 44A(a) (1982) (providing that
the credit would phase down from 30% to 20% of qualifying expenses by 1% for each fraction
of $2,000 by which a taxpayer’s AGI exceeded $10,000). Thus, the percentage would be
reduced as follows: ($22,388 less $10,000)/$2,000 equals (once one rounds up as required) 7,
so that applicable percentage will be 23% (30% - 7%).
256
See id. § 44A(d) (1982) (setting dollar caps at $2,400 for one child or $4,800 for multiple
children). The 23% credit would, therefore be worth $552 or $1,104 in 1981 dollars. In 2017
dollars, these credits would be worth $1,540 for one child and $3,081 for multiple children.
sSee CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
257
Adjusted using CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143, to adjust to January 2017
dollars.
250
251
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1976258
$1,750/
$3,500
$1,750/
$3,500

1981259
$1,540/
$3,080
$1,540/
$3,080

2016260
~$1,270/~$1,270

Top Bracket

$1,750/
$3,500

$1,340/
$2,680

Low Income Brackets Income to Absorb All Benefits
Available
Lowest Income Brackets - Income
Does
Not
Exceed
Benefits
Available

$1,750/
$3,500

$2,010/
$4,020

$2,030/$2,235
(exclusion
+
$200 credit)
$1,080/$2,150

Head of Household
Median Income All Families
Married Filing Jointly
Median Income All Families

$770/$1,230

Benefits Not Refundable

There are many other comparisons that could be made but even
these rough figures reveal interesting trends. The (d)evolution of
our childcare tax benefits has not affected all families the same.
Wealthy taxpayers that require care for only one child actually
receive more relief under the 2016 childcare tax laws than their
counterparts received in 1976 and 1981 (a result that is modified
only slightly by the TCJA’s rates applicable in 2018). But all of the
other taxpayers represented above receive less childcare tax relief
under current laws than their 1976 and 1981 counterparts (once
adjustments are made to constant dollars). And as the table shows,
the diminution of benefits is not equal across income––families at
the median with multiple children, for instance, have been affected
more than wealthier families.
How has this happened? The (d)evolution of our childcare tax
laws did not just escape the attention of our lawmakers. To the
contrary, lawmakers have regularly introduced bills to increase
childcare tax benefits since 1981.261 In the 114th Congressional
session alone, at least twenty-four different proposed bills to
liberalize the childcare tax laws were introduced to an appropriate
committee.262 During this session, lawmakers submitted proposals
See supra notes 202–205 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259–268 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 54–68 and accompanying text. Note that inflation adjustments have
been made from January 2016 to January 2017 to make all numbers constant.
261 A full table of all bills introduced since 1984 is available with Author.
262 See Working Parents Flexibility Act of 2016, H.R. 4699, 114th Cong. (2016); Pathways
Out of Poverty Act of 2015, H.R. 2721, 114th Cong. § 1801 (2015); 21st Century Child Care
Investment Act, H.R. 5828, 114th Cong. (2016); Right Start Child Care and Education Act of
258
259
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to increase263 and even repeal phase-outs,264 a move which would
have put the laws back in line with the generous childcare tax laws
enacted in 1976.265 Other lawmakers submitted proposals to make
the childcare credit available as an above-the-line deduction, a move
which would have fully embraced, for the first time, the view that
childcare expenses are costs of earning income.266 Another proposal
would have raised the percentage credit for young children,
reflecting the particularly high cost of care for preschool aged
children.267 Still other lawmakers proposed to significantly raise the
dollar caps on the childcare tax credit and dependent care
exclusion.268 And still other proposals built in an inflationadjustment mechanism, so that, like many other tax laws,
designated dollar caps would automatically increase to account for
annual inflation.269
Nor is the 114th Congress’s activity anomalous. Each
congressional session since 1984 has seen numerous proposals to
change the childcare tax laws. Over fifteen proposals were
introduced in the 113th Congressional Session to modify the
2015, S. 446, 114th Cong. (2015); Right Start Child Care and Education Act of 2015, H.R.
2703, 114th Cong. (2015); Child Care Access and Refundability Expansion Act, H.R. 1492,
114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Family Care Savings Act, H.R. 750, 114th Cong. (2015); Helping
Working Families Afford Child Care Act, S. 661, 114th Cong. (2015); Helping Working
Families Afford Child Care Act, H.R. 1780, 114th Cong. (2015); Support Working Parents Act
of 2015, H.R. 2184, 114th Cong. (2015); Access to Childcare Expansion Act, S. 3208, 114th
Cong. (2016); Promoting Affordable Childcare for Everyone Act, S. 3233, 114th Cong. (2016);
Working Families Relief Act, H.R. 4867, 114th Cong. (2016); Working Families Relief Act, S.
2879, 114th Cong. (2016);; Dependent Care Savings Account Act of 2015, S. 74, 114th Cong.
(2015); Child and Dependent Care FSA Enhancement Act, S. 215, 114th Cong. (2015); Child
and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act of 2015, S. 820, 114th Cong. (2015); Child
and Dependent Care FSA Enhancement Act, H.R. 1720, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2891, 114th
Cong. (2015); Middle Class Dependent Care Fairness Act of 2016, H.R. 6146, 114th Cong.
(2016); H.R. 5971, 114th Cong. (2016); S. 180, 114th Cong. (2015); Working Parent Support
Act of 2015, H.R. 964, 114th Cong. (2015); 161 Cong. Rec. S1905 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2015)
(listing Senate Amendment 633 to Senate Concurrent Resolution 11). A full table of these
bills is on file with the author.
263 See S. 820 (increasing the phase-out amount to $120,000).
264 See H.R. 2184; H.R. 6146.
265 See supra Section II.B.
266 See S. 180 § 1(b); H.R. 964 § 2(b).
267 See S. 820, § 2(a)(2)(A) (raising percentage credit to 50% for children under age five).
268 See, e.g., S. 180 § 1(a) (increasing caps to $7,000 and $14,000 for one and multiple
children, respectively); H.R. 964, § 1(a) (increasing caps to $7,000 and $14,000 for one and
multiple children, respectively).
269 See, e.g., S. 3208, § 3(a) (raising the limit on exclusion and adjusting also for inflation);
S. 3233, § 3(a)(same).
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childcare tax laws, almost all of which would have made the
childcare tax laws more generous.270 Well over one hundred bills to
modify the childcare tax laws have been introduced into committee
since 2001,271 the last year in which adjustments were made.
But since 1986, rather than prevent childcare tax benefits from
eroding, Congress has opted to create new or expand existing tax
benefits for parents that do not depend on childcare expenses. The
next part of this section tracks the evolution of these other parental
tax benefits before the TCJA was passed.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF OUR PARENTAL TAX LAWS: MAKING ALPHABET
SOUP

While Congress allowed childcare tax benefits to erode since the
mid-eighties, it created new and expanded existing tax benefits that
eligible parents could claim regardless of whether they incurred

270 See Pathways Out of Poverty Act of 2014, H.R. 5352, 113th Cong. § 1801 (2014)
(providing inflation adjustments for the Child Tax Credit); Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1,
113th Cong. § 1102 (2014) (increasing the child tax credit); S. 1975, 113th Cong. (2d Sess.
2014) (allowing above-the-line deductions of $7,000 and $14,000 for one and multiple
children, respectively); H.R. 5365, 113th Cong. (2014) (allowing above-the-line deductions of
$7,000 and $14,000 for one and multiple children, respectively); Right Start Child Care and
Education Act of 2013, S. 56, 113th Cong. (2013) (increasing the percentage of allowable
expenses, income eligibility, and amount creditable); Right Start Child Care and Education
Act of 2013, H.R. 3101, 113th Cong. (2013) (increasing the percentage of allowable expenses,
income eligibility, and amount creditable); Tax Credit for Early Educators Act of 2013, S. 438,
113th Cong. § 4 (2013) (eliminating phase out of dependent care credit); Child Care Access
and Refundability Expansion Act, H.R. 3740, 113th Cong. (2013) (making credit refundable
and providing for inflation adjustment); Support Working Parents Act of 2013, H.R. 1978,
113th Cong. (2013) (eliminating the phase out of the dependent care credit); Child Care Flex
Spending Act of 2013, H.R. 3497, 113th Cong. (2013) (increasing the exclusion amount for
employer-provided assistance); Child Care Flex Spending Act of 2013, S. 1713, 113th Cong.
(2013) (increasing the exclusion amount for employer-provided assistance); Helping Working
Families Afford Child Care Act, S. 2565, 113th Cong. (2013) (increasing dependent care
credit, adjusting for inflation, and making credit refundable); Families First Act, H.R. 5258,
113th Cong. (2014) (providing inflation adjustments); Middle Class Dependent Care Fairness
Act of 2013, H.R. 2048, 113th Cong. (2013) (eliminating phase out); Dependent Care Savings
Account Act of 2014, H.R. 5326, 113th Cong. (2014) (establishing dependent care savings
accounts and providing deductions for amounts paid into them); Dependent Care Savings
Account Act of 2014, S. 2806, 113th Cong. (2014) (establishing dependent care savings
accounts and providing deductions for amounts paid into them); Child and Dependent Care
FSA Enhancement Act, S. 2997, 113th Cong. (2014) (increasing the exclusion amount for
employer-provided assistance and providing for inflation adjustment).
271 A table of all bills is available with Author.
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childcare costs to work outside the home. This part tracks the
evolution of these parental tax benefits before the TCJA was passed.
1. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
As discussed above, Congress made significant changes to the
childcare tax laws in 1976, eliminating income limitations entirely
and allowing all parents to credit 20% of their childcare expenses
up to historically generous dollar caps.272 But this was not the most
important change made to the parental tax laws around that time.
In 1975, the first version of the still-existing Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) was enacted.273 Scholars have devoted substantial
time chronicling the history behind the EITC274 and it is
unnecessary to replicate that work here. A cursory historical
summary suffices.
The EITC was originally envisioned as a modest subsidy to aid
poor, working families.275 Specifically, parents earning at least
$4,000 but not more than $8,000 were entitled to a credit,276 which
was designed to offset the payroll tax on salary income.277 The
maximum credit was $400,278 or about $1,750 in current dollars.279
The original EITC pursued humble goals such as “prevent[ing] the
social security tax from taking away from the poor and low-income
earners the money they need for support of their families.”280

See supra Part II.B.
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2012)).
274 See, e.g., Dennis Ventry, The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History
of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-1999, 53 NAT’L TAX. J. 983, 996 (2000) (“[M]uch to
everyone’s surprise . . . at the end of the 1970s . . . [the EITC] would no longer comprise simply
a modest work subsidy . . . [but would instead] represent an anti–poverty device . . . .”).
275 See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations on TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533 (1994) (“The earned income tax credit
(EITC), which uses the federal income tax system to provide an earnings subsidy to lowincome workers, has enjoyed support across the political spectrum as a ‘pro-work, pro-family’
alternative to traditional welfare programs.”).
276 See id.
277 Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Sized
Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (“According to the
legislative history, the purposes of the EITC included encouraging employment, reducing
welfare rolls, and offsetting the burdens of the payroll tax.”).
278 See id.
279 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January 2017).
280 See 118 CONG. REC. 33010, 33011 (1972) (statement of Sen. Long).
272
273
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But the EITC soon emerged as a full-fledged “anti-poverty
device” and by 1986 was well on its way towards being a vital tool
in America’s kit for alleviating poverty.281 Unlike the childcare tax
laws, the EITC amount was adjusted for inflation several times
before 1986282 and then, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, was
indexed for inflation permanently.283
Then came the nineties. President Clinton took office in 1993,
vowing to “make work pay.”284 As part of this effort, the number of
families eligible to claim the EITC expanded and the credit amount
increased substantially.285 These changes nearly tripled the annual
cost of the EITC.286
In 2001, Congress made additional changes to the EITC. It again
increased the number of families eligible to claim the credit by
lowering the phase-in rate for married couples in an attempt to
ameliorate the “marriage penalty.” And it excluded certain amounts
from the definition of earned income,287 which allowed more
taxpayers to qualify for the EITC because less income “counted”

Ventry, supra note 274, at 996, 1003.
See Zelenak, supra note 277, at 304.
283 See id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107–
08); Ventry, supra note 274, at 1002 (“Moreover, TRA 86 guaranteed the future integrity of
the EITC by indexing it for inflation.”).
284 See William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Statement on Signing the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Aug. 22, 1996), in
1996 Pub. Papers 1328, 1329–30 (“Combined with the newly increased minimum wage and
the Earned Income Tax Credit—which this legislation maintains—H.R. 3734 will make work
pay for more Americans.”).
285 See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31768, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
(EITC): AN OVERVIEW 17–18 (2014) (“Fulfillment of [President Clinton’s] pledge required a
proposal to raise the EITC credit rates, especially for families with two or more children.
[President Clinton’s] proposal was enacted as part of OBRA of 1993 (P.L. 103-66) with little
change by Congress.”).
286 See Ventry, supra note 274, at 1004–05 (“Under the changes produced by the 1990 and
1993 bills, the cost of the EITC almost tripled, jumping from $7.5 billion in 1990 to $21.1
billion in 1994 (current dollars) . . . . When examining over a longer time period, the expansion
appeared more dramatic. From 1986 to 1996, EITC expenditures grew by 1,191 percent. . .
.”).
287 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 301–
03, 115 Stat. 38, 53–57 (2001).
281
282
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when determining eligibility.288 In 2009, Congress increased the
credit amount available to families with three or more children.289
Today, “the [EITC] has grown into [America’s] largest federal
anti-poverty program,”290 and offers refundable credits.291 In 2016,
a single mother with one, two, and three or more children would be
entitled to claim some EITC so long as her income did not exceed
$39,296, $44,648, and $47,955, respectively.292 A married couple
filing jointly could claim some EITC for one, two and three or more
children so long as their income did not exceed $44,846, $50,198 and
$53,505, respectively.293 The maximum credit for one, two and three
or more children is $3,373, $5,572 and $6,269, respectively.294 These
amounts are all substantially larger than the original credit amount
available in 1976 when the EITC was enacted.295
The EITC is expensive. In 2016, it was estimated to cost $73
billion in foregone revenue and refund payments.296 It is among one
of the largest tax expenditures in the Code.297 But the enactment of
the EITC was not the only major change in parental tax laws made
during the childcare tax law’s (d)evolutionary period.
2. The Child Tax Credit (CTC) and the Additional Child Tax
Credit (ACTC)
In the mid-1990s, Congress enacted a modest child tax credit (the
CTC) that, at the time, benefitted mainly middle- and upperId.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 1002, 123 Stat.
115, 312 (2009). Other changes were made in 2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012, Pub. L. No.112–240, § 103, 126 Stat. 2313, 2319 (2012).
290 See Zelenak, supra note 277, at 301 (citation omitted).
291 I.R.C. § 32 (2012).
292 2016 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law Updates, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/individuals/earned-income-taxcredit/eitc-income-limits-maximum-credit-amounts (last accessed Jan. 20, 2019).
293 Id.
294 The credit varies by income. Id.
295 The original credit was $400 in 1976. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12 §
204, 89. Stat. 26, 30. $400 is worth approximately $1,750 in 2017 dollars. See CPI Inflation
Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January of each relevant year).
296 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX
EXPENDITURES
FOR
FISCAL
YEARS
2016–2020
39
(2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4971 [hereinafter JCT REPORT].
297 See, e.g., Drew DeSilver, The Biggest U.S. Tax Breaks, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 6,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/06/the-biggest-u-s-tax-breaks/ (listing
the EITC as the sixth largest tax expenditure).
288
289
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middle-class families with children.298 This credit should not be
confused with the childcare tax credit, upon which this paper has
focused. Like the EITC, the CTC was and continues to be available
to eligible families regardless of whether they incur expenses to
work outside the home (or indeed whether they incur childcare
expenses of any kind at all).
The original 1997 CTC allowed for a credit of $500 per child and
was not refundable unless a family had three or more children.299
The credit amount was lowered to $400 in 1998.300 The credit phased
out at higher income levels, starting at “$75,000 for single
individuals, $110,000 for married couples filing jointly, and $55,000
for married individuals filing separately.”301
In 2001, George W. Bush’s Presidency began. During his first
term, Congress passed significant tax breaks for families—often
referred to colloquially as the “Bush Tax Cuts”302—through the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001303 and
the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.304 In
addition to tax changes that mainly helped high-income earners—
such as lowering the top marginal tax rates and repealing the estate
tax temporarily305—there were several changes that were aimed at
the middle class. As part of these latter measures, the CTC was
expanded and increased.306 Specifically, in 2001, the CTC was set to
increase from $600 to $1,000 over a period of years.307 But two years
later, the pace was accelerated and the CTC was increased to $1,000

298 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–34, § 101, 111 Stat. 788, 796 (1997)
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 24 (2012)). For more history on the CTC, see Jennifer
McGroarty, Time for the Child Tax Credit to Grow Up: Preserving the Credit's Availability
and Enhancing Benefits for Families, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 301, 306–10 (2011).
299 § 101, 111 Stat. at 796 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 24 (2012)).
300 McGroarty, supra note 298, at 307.
301 Id.
302 See, e.g., Scott Greenberg, Looking Back at the Bush Tax Cuts, Fifteen Years Later, TAX
FOUNDATION (June 7, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/looking-back-bush-tax-cuts-fifteenyears-later/ (“[The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001] is often
referred to as the first of two ‘Bush tax cuts.’”).
303 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001).
304 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat.
752 (2003).
305 §§ 101, 501, 115 Stat. at 41, 69.
306 § 201, 115 Stat. at 45.
307 Id.
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per child.308 The CTC was not changed again until the TCJA went
into effect.309
Given the CTC’s phase-outs (which were set in 1997 and not
changed until the TCJA’s passage), 310 the CTC does far more than
provide aid to the working poor—instead, it provides benefits to
parents of moderate and above-moderate means. In 2017, families
earning between $100,000 and $200,000 received almost $10 billion
of the $55 billion benefits provided through the CTC.311 Families
earning over $50,000 claimed over $26 billion of all claimed benefits,
which is slightly more than the CTC and ACTC benefits claimed by
families earning below $50,000 and over five times the total cost of
the childcare tax credit and dependency care exclusion.312
In 2001, Congress reformed the CTC so that the credit could also
benefit the working poor. Congress made the child tax credit
partially refundable, providing benefits that supplement the
EITC.313 Once taxpayers surpassed an income threshold, below
which no refund was available, the refundable portion of the credit
increased as income rose until the maximum credit of $1,000 per
child was attained.314 Thus, like the EITC, the refundable portion of
the child tax credit (often referred to as the additional child tax
credit, or ACTC) requires a family to work but does not depend on
whether childcare costs are incurred to do so.
In 2001, Congress set the refundability threshold for the ACTC
at $10,000.315 In 2009, the threshold was reduced to $3,000,316
where it remained until the TCJA lowered it further.317
While the CTC and ACTC are not as costly as the EITC, both tax
credits still bear a large price tag and together constitute one of the
§101, 117 Stat. at 753.
INTERNAL REV. SERV., DEPT. OF TREASURY, PUB. 972, CHILD TAX CREDIT 2 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p972--2016.pdf.
310 Id. at 3 (showing the AGI ceilings as $75,000 for single individuals, $110,000 for married
couples filing jointly, and $55,000 for married individuals filing separately).
311 JCT REPORT, supra note 296, at 48 (showing amount received at $9,696,000,000).
312
Id. at 48 (totaling $26.34B).
313 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 201(c),
115 Stat. 38, 46 (2001).
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Jobs Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 101, 117 Stat
753 (2003).
317 Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 101, 129 Stat.
3040, 3044 (2015).
308
309
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more expensive tax expenditure provisions in the Code. In 2016, for
instance, the CTC was estimated to cost $55 billion in foregone tax
revenue and refunds,318 eleven times the estimated cost of the
childcare tax laws.319
3. The Zero Bracket.
In addition to creating an alphabet soup of new tax benefits, the
Code traditionally allowed parents to claim a personal exemption
amount to reduce their taxable income for each dependent child in
their primary care (though, as discussed below, the TCJA repealed
it).320 Thus, for instance, a couple that was married and filing jointly
could historically claim four personal exemption amounts while a
single parent with two children could have claimed three. Like the
CTC, parents were able to claim the personal exemption regardless
of whether childcare costs were incurred. Congress consistently
adjusted the personal deduction amount for inflation since the mideighties.321
The personal exemption amount traditionally phased out, but at
very high-income levels. In 2017, couples that were married and
filed jointly would have been phased out of their benefits if their
adjusted gross income exceeded $313,800 and benefits would have
phased out completely if they earned more than $436,300.322 For
single filers, the phase out began at $261,500 and ended at
$384,000.323 Thus since the mid-eighties and until the TCJA’s
repeal, Congress maintained the personal exemption so that it
provided relatively consistent benefits to parents in even the upper
income strata regardless of childcare needs. And because the value
of the personal exemption increased with the marginal tax bracket
of the family claiming it, wealthier parents benefitted more than
those of lesser means.324
JCT REPORT, supra note 296, at 37.
Id.
320 See I.R.C. §§ 151(c), 152(a) (2012).
321 I.R.C. § 63(c)(4) (requiring adjustments for inflation for years after 1988).
322 Rev. Proc. 2016-55 § 3.24, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.
323 Id.
324 Throughout the devolutionary period, the standard deduction and tax rates also
changed significantly. For instance, in 1986, tax rates were slashed for all individual
taxpayers. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096 (1986)
(amending tax rates). And the standard deduction amount, created in 1971, has increased in
value over time, particularly for married taxpayers who can now (but could not always) claim
318
319
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Congress has, since 1971, also allowed taxpayers to claim a
standard deduction amount, in lieu of itemizing their deductions.
The standard deduction amount is not a parental tax benefit—the
same deduction is available for taxpayers that are married and
filing jointly, regardless of whether they have dependent children in
their care. But it bears mentioning for two reasons. First, the
standard deduction is generally discussed along with the personal
exemption because together these two benefits define a “zero
bracket” amount—i.e. an amount of income below which no federal
income tax will be levied. Second, as will be seen below, the TCJA
conflated the two benefits. In 2016, a married couple filing jointly
was entitled to a standard deduction of $12,600 and a head of
household was entitled to $9,300.325 Like the personal exemption,
the standard deduction amount has been consistently adjusted for
inflation since the mid-eighties.
This Part concludes by putting this alphabet soup of parental tax
benefits together and showing how the (d)evolution of our parental
tax laws resulted in an important shift in spending priorities that
perpetuated the inequities that had been addressed by previous
reforms.
4. Shifted Priorities, Perpetuated Inequities
As the previous discussion has shown, while many working
parents lost childcare tax benefits over the past several decades,
Congress created new parental tax benefits during that time and
expanded others that previously existed. This, of course, mitigated
the financial sting for working parents whose childcare tax benefits
had devolved. Nevertheless, through these parental tax reforms,
Congress altered the way in which parents were taxed. In the
process, it contributed to the inequitable taxation of families with
different childcare needs.
The CTC and personal exemption provide the same benefits to
families of the same size and earning the same income. They are

double the deduction available to single filers. See Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178,
§203, 85 Stat. 497, 511 (1971). But these changes apply equally to all taxpayers with the same
filing status and thus are not even dependent on whether a taxpayer has children nor whether
costs are incurred to care for them.
325 See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615, § 3.14 (promulgating 2016 standard
deductions).
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facially neutral. But these laws do not exist in a vacuum. As
discussed in Section I.A., unless the Code allows working parents to
recover their childcare costs or taxes the imputed income of nonpaid arrangements, the tax laws favor families that do not have to
purchase childcare on the external market.326 Giving all families the
same tax benefit does nothing to narrow the magnitude of this
inequity.
Moreover, the magnitude of this inequity has grown—and will,
without further action, continue to grow. While the benefits
available under the childcare tax laws have largely remained static
in nominal terms, childcare costs have risen steadily to (at least)
reflect inflation. Thus, the inequitable taxation of families with
different childcare needs has worsened over time.
Despite this, however, the TCJA treaded the same well-worn
path created by Congress over the prior three decades.
C. THE TCJA: MORE OF THE SAME

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)—enacted in the twilight of
2017 through a historically rushed process327—was touted by its
proponents as providing tax cuts to working families.328 The TCJA
did expand the relief available to working poor families. While it did
not alter the Earned Income Tax Credit329—the primary mechanism
by which the Code addresses the plight of families that are in or
near poverty330—it expanded the benefits available under the
refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit (i.e. the Additional Child
Tax Credit). Most significantly, it raised the maximum per child
refund to $1,400331—up from $1,000 though not up to the new
See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Bob Bryan, Experts are Starting to Find Massive Errors in the GOP Tax Bill
After it went through Congress at Lightning Speed, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 6, 2017, 3:49 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-gop-tax-reform-bill-mistakes-corporate-amt-2017-12
(noting that the TCJA “moved through both chambers of Congress at legislative light speed”
and “experts are starting to find a slew of errors they say are most likely the result of a rushed
process.”); Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Senate Overcomes Hiccups to Advance Tax
Overhaul in 51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2017, at A15 (noting that Democratic Senator
Charles Schumer “warned that Republicans would come to regret rushing the tax bill through
Congress”).
328 See supra note 7.
329 See generally Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
330 See supra Part III.B.2.
331 § 11022(a), 131 Stat. at 2073–74.
326
327
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$2,000 per child credit available to parents with sufficient income
to absorb it (and discussed below).332 The TCJA also lowered the
earned-income threshold so that parents can claim refunds once
their earned income reaches $2,500, down from $3,000.333 Thus, as
it has historically done, the 115th Congress exhibited a continuing
willingness to use the Code to provide aid to the working poor.
For parents that are not in or near poverty, the TCJA’s parental
tax reforms strongly resemble Congress’ practices since the mideighties. In the name of simplification, the TCJA eliminated the
personal exemption entirely,334 (which depended on the number of
dependent children in a parent’s care) and doubled the standard
deduction335 (which does not depend on number of children). The
TCJA then doubled the child tax credit from $1,000 to $2,000 for
each dependent child, added an additional credit for non-child
dependents such as elderly relatives, and dramatically raised the
phase-out levels to $400,000 for taxpayers that are married filing
jointly and $200,000 for all other filers.336 But as mentioned
throughout this Article, it left the childcare tax laws untouched so
that none of the expanded relief depends on whether childcare costs
are actually incurred.
The extent to which a particular family’s tax bill will be lowered
obviously depends on its particular situation. But one thing is quite
clear: The TCJA did not address the inequitable taxation of families
with different childcare needs and instead left childcare tax benefits
to devolve further in value.
The final section of this article takes the history developed in
these previous three sections to consider the future of America’s
childcare tax laws.
IV. USING THE PAST TO INFORM THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S
CHILDCARE TAX LAWS
The previous three sections have provided a holistic look at the
(d)evolution of our childcare and parental tax laws. In order to use

332
333
334
335
336

Id.
Id.
§ 11041, 131 Stat. at 2082–85.
§ 11021, 131 Stat. at 2072–73.
§ 11022, 131 Stat. at 2073–74.
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this history to inform future debates, the first part of this section
turns to a still unanswered question: Why was this (d)evolution
politically feasible? Why aren’t working parents demanding reform
of the childcare tax laws? Why doesn’t anyone seem to be asking
whether children are more important than martinis, organizing
Baby Carriage Brigades, or dressing children as oil wells?
Coupling these political insights with the history developed
throughout this Article, this section then discusses possible reforms
to our childcare tax laws.
A. PUBLIC SENTIMENT: WHERE THERE WAS OUTRAGE, APATHY

As discussed above, Congress liberalized the childcare tax laws
in the 1970s and 1980s,337 more equitably taxing families with
different childcare needs. But in the ensuing decades these laws
have devolved, once again taxing family models inequitably.
Demographics suggest that an increasing number of families are
adversely affected by this devolution.
To start, the number of American families that consist of two
earners seems to be consistently rising. In 1970 (around the time
that Congress started to significantly liberalize the childcare tax
laws), half of two-parent families consisted of one earner, who was
almost always the father.338 But today, a full two-thirds of two-

See supra Section II.B.
See Kim Parker & Gretchen Livingston, 7 Facts About American Dads, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (June 13, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/18/fathers-day-facts/
(“About a quarter of couples (27%) who live with children younger than 18 are in families
where only the father works. This marks a dramatic change from 1970, when almost half of
these couples (47%) were in families where only the dad worked.”); D’Vera Cohn et al., After
Decades of Decline, A Rise in Stay-at-Home Mothers, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/04/08/after-decades-of-decline-a-rise-in-stay-at-homemothers/ (“The share of mothers who do not work outside the home rose to 29% in 2012, up
from a modern-era low of 23% in 1999, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of
government data.”); see also Sarah Jane Glynn, The New Breadwinners: 2010
Update, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 16, 2012 9:00 am), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/economy/reports/2012/04/16/11377/the-new-breadwinners-2010-update/
(“[M]ost
children today are growing up in families without a full-time, stay-at-home caregiver. In 2010,
among families with children, nearly half (44.8 percent) were headed by two working parents
and another one in four (26.1 percent) were headed by a single parent. As a result, fewer than
one in three (28.7 percent) children now have a stay-at-home parent, compared to more than
half (52.6 percent) in 1975, only a generation ago.”).
337
338
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parent families are dual-earners,339 meaning that both parents
work outside of the home and earn income.340 And there is reason to
believe that the one-earner, two-parent model will continue its
decline. For Millennials—defined roughly as those born between
1980 and the mid-1990’s341— dual-earner households are likely to
be the norm.”342 One report found that 78% of millennial couples
consist of two earners, compared to 47% of couples in the so-called
boomer generation343–– individuals who were born between 1946
and 1964.344
339 Scott A. Hodge & Andrew Lundeen, America Has Become a Nation of Dual-Income
Working Couples, TAX FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/america-hasbecome-nation-dual-income-working-couples (“Mothers worked during the 1960s but fewer
than half of all married couples during that era were dual-earners. Today, that number has
risen to 66 percent, more than twice the number of sole-earner married couples. This means
that a large share of married couple tax returns have two incomes and thus are now clustered
in the upper income groups facing the highest marginal tax rates.”).
340 See Raising Kids and Running a Household: How Working Parents Share the Load, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/11/04/raising-kids-andrunning-a-household-how-working-parents-share-the-load/. Of course, there are many ways
that families can share the burdens of income production and work inside the home. The Pew
Research Center reports that “the share of two-parent households in which both parents work
full time now stands at 46%, up from 31% in 1970,” but “the share with a father who works
full time and a mother who doesn’t work outside the home has declined considerably; 26% of
two-parent households today fit this description, compared with 46% in 1970 . . . . ” Id.
341 There is not yet any well-established, precise definition of Millennial. See Richard Fry,
Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest Generation, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/25/millennials-overtake-babyboomers/ (“Pew Research Center has established that the oldest “Millennial” was born in
1981. The Center continues to assess demographic, attitudinal and other evidence on habits
and culture that will help to establish when the youngest Millennial was born or even when
a new generation begins . . . . To distill the implications of the census numbers for
generational heft, this analysis assumes that the youngest Millennial was born in
1997.”(citations omitted)); see also Samantha Raphelson, Amid the Stereotypes, Some Facts
About
Millennials,
NPR
(Nov.
18,
2014,
5:23pm),
http://www.npr.org/2014/11/18/354196302/amid-the-stereotypes-some-facts-aboutmillennials (“There is no consensus on the exact years that generations begin and end. For
this post, we’ve defined millennials as those born between 1980 and 2000; Generation X,
between 1965 and 1979; and baby boomers, between 1946 and 1964. Also, these charts
represent averages—there will always be exceptions to these trends.”).
342 Dan Schawbel, The Expanding Roles of Millennials in the Workplace, FORBES (Dec. 13,
2011, 8:35am), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danschawbel/2011/12/13/the-expanding-roles-ofmillennials-in-the-workplace/#533420f11d6c.
343 Millennials: “Generation Go”, ERNST & YOUNG LLP, https://www.ey.com/us/en/aboutus/our-people-and-culture/ey-infographic-millennials-generation-go (last access Jan. 20,
2019).
344 The definition of Baby Boomers, or Boomers, is relatively fixed (as opposed to the
definition of Millennials). See, e.g., Phillip Bump, Here is When Each Generation Begins and
Ends,
According
to
Facts,
ATLANTIC
WIRE
(Mar.
25,
2014),
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The number of families that consist of single mothers has risen
dramatically over the past several decades, too.345 The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention found that in 2014, births to
unmarried women constituted 40% of all births.346 In 1980, births
to unmarried women constituted less than 20% of all births.347 And
these numbers may continue to rise—approximately 57% of
Millennials aged 26 to 31 have birthed children out of marriage.348
“Single motherhood,” it is reported, “has grown so common in
America that demographers now believe half of all children will live
with a single mom at some point before the age of 18.”349
As the number of dual-earner and single parents rise, more
American parents find themselves struggling with the high costs of
private childcare, which have also risen since the 1970s and 1980s.
Today, these costs may be one of the highest costs in an American
family’s budgets, sometimes exceeding rent and in-state college
tuition.350 One would, therefore, expect a growing number of
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/here-is-when-each-generation-beginsand-ends-according-to-facts/359589/ (“I started by calling the Census Bureau. A
representative called me back, without much information. ‘We do not define the different
generations,’ she told me. ‘The only generation we do define is Baby Boomers and that year
bracket is from 1946 to 1964.’”).
345 See Emily Badger, The Unbelievable Rise of Single Motherhood in America Over the Last
50
Years,
WASH.
POST:
WONKBLOG
(Dec.
18,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/18/the-unbelievable-rise-of-singlemotherhood-in-america-over-the-last-50-years/.
346 Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Final Data for 2014, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 23,
2015, at 7, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_12.pdf. Interestingly, this does
represent a steady decline from 2007, when the single motherhood rate peaked at over 50%.
Id. For purposes of this Article, however, the important observation is that single motherhood
is becoming a common family composition, which, unlike single earning two parent families,
very often requires outside childcare.
347 Id.
348 See Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Why Are So Many Millennials Having Children Out of
Wedlock?, ATLANTIC (July 18, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/
07/why-are-so-many-millennials-having-children-out-of-wedlock/491753/
(reporting
on
studies); see also John Fleming, Gallup Analysis: Millennials, Marriage and Family, GALLUP
NEWS (May 19, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/191462/gallup-analysis-millennialsmarriage-family.aspx (“Most millennials have not yet married, and they are waiting longer
to marry. For 34-year-olds, just over half (56%) are married, and of these, 83% have children.
But a substantial number (46%) of those who have never been married and are well into their
30s have children. This may represent a seismic shift in the connection between marriage
and child rearing because as recently as 2000, the comparable percentage of single/never
married 30- to 34-year-olds with children was just 30%.”).
349 Badger, supra note 345.
350 See CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., supra note 2, at 4.
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working parents to pressure congresspersons to at least adjust the
childcare tax laws for inflation. But compared to the public outcry
of the seventies and eighties, even working parents—the
constituency most affected by our severe childcare tax laws—seem
relatively apathetic.
There are obviously many ways in which the seventies and
eighties differ from today. How can these differences help explain
why even working parents seem unfazed by the devolution of our
childcare tax laws? To start, today’s parental tax laws are more
complex than they were in the seventies and eighties, consisting of
an alphabet soup of benefits whose different purposes may not be
readily discernible to the untrained eye.351 Further, as discussed
above, the devolution of our childcare tax benefits occurred slowly
through decades of inaction.352 And because Congress created new
and expanded existing parental benefits, the actual financial impact
to any particular family was not felt as acutely as it otherwise would
have been.
Moreover, the rhetoric employed to defend current parental tax
laws can sound persuasive to the untrained ear. Whereas their
predecessors were bald in their assertions about gender roles,
today’s lawmakers utilize arguments that can pass as normatively
sterile. Lawmakers often claim that extending benefits to all
parents, rather than just helping working parents with childcare
costs, allows each family to choose the earning arrangement that is
best for them.
For instance, a vociferous proponent of expanding the CTC,
Republican Senator Marco Rubio wrote that “[e]nhancing the Child
Tax Credit . . . would . . . promote family flexibility. Families can
claim the credit regardless of parenting or work arrangements,
empowering working and stay-at-home parents equally and
increasing their ability to choose the best parenting arrangement
for their situation.”353
351 See Part III.B; see also ELAINE MAAG ET AL., INCREASING FAMILY COMPLEXITY AND
VOLATILITY: THE DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING CHILD TAX BENEFITS 19 (Mar. 3, 2016),
available at https://www.urban.org/research/publication/increasing-family-complexity-andvolatility-difficulty-determining-child-tax-benefits.
352 See Part II.
353 Sen. Marco Rubio, We Need Real Tax Reform That Empowers Families, BREITBART (Aug.
3, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/08/03/marco-rubio-we-need-realtax-reform-that-empowers-families/.
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These appeals to neutrality are specious. As discussed in Section
I.A., the Code already favors families that do not have to incur
childcare costs to work. Its failure to tax the imputed income from
non-paid care arrangements coupled with our restrictive childcare
tax laws result in the inequitable taxation of parents with different
childcare needs. And, as discussed in Section III.C, expanding
benefits under provisions like the CTC which do not depend on
actual childcare expenses does not correct for this discrepancy but
instead allows it to grow. Nevertheless, these argumentative flaws
can be easily (and understandably) lost on non-tax experts, which
may help explain why today’s parents seem relatively indifferent to
our parental tax laws.
Additionally, expectations about the role the American
government should play in parent’s lives have changed. In 1971, the
Comprehensive Child Comprehensive Child Development Act
(CCDA) was passed by both houses of Congress and would have, in
the words of one expert, “brought to fruition the feminist vision for
universal childcare.”354 The CCDA allocated $2.1 billion, nearly $13
billion in 2017 dollars,355 for a national childcare program that
would have provided free care for families of lower-middle class
backgrounds and provided care on a sliding-fee scale based on
income exceeding a designated threshold.356 Thus, the CCDA “came
close to recognizing childcare as a universal right, rather than a
means-based entitlement,”357 which some feminist groups believed
was indispensable if women were to attain full “social
citizenship.”358 It is reported that some feminist advocates wept in
Congress when it was passed.359
354 Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex
Equality, 46 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 415, 461 (2011).
355 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 143 (calculated as of January of each relevant
year). The maximum value that the CPI Inflation Calculator can adjust is $10 million. Thus,
this figure was calculated based on the January 2017 value of $10 million in January 1971
dollars, which is $61,014,824.
356 Comprehensive Child Development Act, S. 1512, 92d Cong. (1st Sess. 1971). See also
Dinner, supra note 354, at 461 (“The CCDA would have allocated $2.1 billion in its first year
for childcare services available for free to lower-middle-income families and on a sliding-fee
scale thereafter.”).
357 Dinner, supra note 354, at 461.
358 SONYA MICHEL, CHILDREN’S INTERESTS/MOTHERS’ RIGHTS: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S
CHILD CARE POLICY 2 (1999) (“[C]hild care might be said to constitute part of what political
theorist T.H. Marshall called ‘social citizenship.’”).
359 ROSEN, WORLD SPLIT OPEN, supra note 1, at 90.
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The victory, however, ultimately eluded them. President Nixon
unexpectedly vetoed the legislation,360 delivering a scathing
message to Congress.361 The CCDA, Nixon chided, ran the risk of
“altering the family relationship” and “diminish[ing] both parental
authority and parental involvement with children—particularly in
th[e] decisive early years.”362 And the CCDA, he continued, would
commit the “vast moral authority of the National Government to the
side of communal approaches to child rearing over [and] against the
family-centered approach,”363 a message that was apparently a
toned-down version of the one Senior Advisor Pat Buchanan wanted
Nixon to deliver, which would have accused proponents of
“Sovietizing” childcare.364
Nevertheless, the intent behind Nixon’s message was concordant
with Buchanan’s hopes to not just veto the bill but to “kill” the idea
of universal childcare completely.365 That goal has been largely
achieved. “Nixon's veto message,” one expert explains, “was
carefully crafted to cosset rightwing, anti-Communist, anti-feminist
sentiment . . . and taint[ed] the concept of universal child care to
such an extent that for years to come, few Republicans dared to
support it.”366 Today, the fact that the CCDA garnered bipartisan
support is difficult to comprehend.
But Nixon’s veto did more than chill the support of politically
conservative lawmakers. Since the demise of the CCDA, normative
expectations about what role the American government can be
expected to play in caring for children changed. Many of today’s
working parents, particularly those with young children, were not
born when the CCDA was passed and vetoed or were far too young

360 MICHEL, supra note 387, at 248 (“[P]roponents of comprehensive federal policies toward
children expected Nixon to sign the bill. Thus his eventual veto—expressed in rather harsh
terms—came as something of a surprise.”).
361 Emily Badger, That One Time America Almost Got Universal Childcare, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/06/
23/that-one-time-america-almost-got-universal-child-care/?utm_term=.19287240d790
(“Then Nixon (with the urging of Pat Buchanan, then working in the White House) vetoed it
with scathing language denouncing the ‘radical’ idea that government should help rear
children in the place of their parents.”).
362 117 CONG. REC. 46,059 (1971).
363 Id.
364 COLLINS, supra note 42, at 288.
365 Id.
366 MICHEL, supra note 387, at 251.
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to remember it. Today, Professor Gail Collins writes, “most
Americans take it as a given that they are on their own,” and find it
difficult to believe “that the government has. . . seriously considered
offering anything more than a patchwork system to help the very
poor.”367 Lacking historical perspective, American parents assume
that “we should be self-sufficient in providing [child] care, without
any need for government support.”368 The shift towards and
acceptance of what Professor Robert Drago and others have termed
the “norm of individualism”369 likely plays a critical role in
explaining the public’s relative apathy towards our devolved
childcare tax laws.
The veto of the CCDA also seemed to alter the feminist agenda,
changing the reforms that were deemed feasible and advocated for
in the public view. Professor Deborah Dinner, for instance, writes
that Nixon’s veto of the CCDA “contributed to a decline in rightsbased childcare activism.”370 She references historian Sonya
Michel’s work, explaining that “the defeat of the CCDA marked a
deepening bifurcation of childcare policy along class lines . . . toward
public childcare for the poor and private, market-based childcare for
the working and middle classes.”371 This shift, Dinner continues,
“made it considerably more difficult for women of different class
backgrounds to envision a political world in which they h[o]ld
shared interests in childcare policy. In this constrained political
context, feminists no longer claim[] the right to universal
childcare.”372
This change in emphasis is reflected in past and present
feminist agenda. High-profile, hegemonic Second Wave feminist
groups often demanded that the government play a central role in
providing accessible and affordable childcare to all working women,
regardless of means. The NOW Bill of Rights, for instance,
demanded “[t]hat child-care facilities be established by law on the
same basis as parks, libraries, and public schools, adequate to the
needs of children, from the preschool years through adolescence, as
COLLINS, supra note 42, at 285.
Golden, supra note 44, at 623.
369
Id.
370 Deborah Dinner, The Universal Childcare Debate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy,
and the Dynamics of Feminist Activism, 1966-1974, 28 L. & HISTORY REV. 577, 584 (2010).
371 Id. (citing MICHEL, supra note 387, at 236–38).
372 Id.
367
368
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a community resource to be used by all citizens from all income
levels.”373
Similarly, the National Plan of Action, adopted at the National
Women’s Conference in Houston in 1977 demanded that “[t]he
Federal government . . . assume a major role in directing and
providing comprehensive . . . child care.”374 The Strike for Women's
Equality, held in 1970, “made three central demands: universal
childcare, equal employment opportunity, and free abortion on
demand.”375 These feminist groups viewed “universal childcare as a
prerequisite for equal citizenship.”376
By contrast, some Third Wave (i.e. Post-Second Wave) feminist
agendas fail to even mention the issue of childcare.377 Other modern
feminist agendas, such as the agenda drafted to support the 2017
Women’s March in Washington D.C., mention the need for
affordable childcare but do not identify it as a central priority, and
do not specify how issues should be addressed, or by whom.378
The modern feminist agenda may also focus less on childcare
because of an increased commitment to diversity, inclusion, and
intersectionalism. Hegemonic Second Wave feminist groups, such
as NOW, have been roundly criticized for their lack of inclusivity.379
These groups tended to focus on a particular set of issues (e.g. the
ability to pursue a “career” if one chose) felt mainly by upper-class
white women and often ignored the distinct and varied issues faced
by women of different socio-economic, racial, and other

373 NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, BILL OF RIGHTS FOR WOMEN IN 1968, originally issued at NOW
convention 1968, reprinted in THE SIXTIES IN AMERICA: PRIMARY SOURCES 87, 91 (Tom
Pendergrast
&
Sara
Pendergrast
eds.,
2004),
available
at
http://www.encyclopediajudaica.com/pdf/samples/sp692484.pdf.
374 NAT’L WOMEN’S CONFERENCE, NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION (1977).
375 Dinner, supra note 354, at 459.
376 Id.
377 ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN, supra note 1 at 359 (“One issue . . . that did not appear
on the Third Wave feminist agenda was child care.”).
378 Unity
Principles,
WOMEN’S
MARCH
ON
WASHINGTON
2017,
https://www.womensmarch.com/principles/ (last accessed Jan. 20, 2019) (“All women should
be paid equitably, with access to affordable childcare, sick days, healthcare, paid family leave,
and healthy work environments.”).
379 Much has been written to this effect. See, e.g., HOOKS, supra note 123, at 1 (“Feminism
in the United States has never emerged from the women who are most victimized by sexist
oppression.”) Indeed, the book “heralded as having paved the way for contemporary feminist
movement,” THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE, “was written as if these women did not exist.” Id.
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backgrounds.380 Women in lower income classes (statistically more
often women of color), for instance, generally did not have a choice
of whether to work and did not view their work as a “career” path
towards self-fulfillment, but as a method of survival.381 Hegemonic
Second Wave feminists, therefore, had the relatively narrow task of
devising an agenda that addressed the issues faced by the subset of
women on which they focused. Women need affordable childcare,
they easily understood, if they were to have meaningful choices to
pursue careers, and the government, they believed, should help in
that pursuit.
However, more inclusive, modern feminist movements
sometimes press towards a more “non-essential” view of
womanhood and reject the idea perpetuated by non-intersectional
feminists that there is one unifying, singular circumstance that
defines women382—and towards an intersectional feminism—i.e.
one that recognizes the distinct issues and circumstances women of
varying backgrounds confront.383 An intersectional feminist agenda,
therefore, must encompass far more diverse issues, which some
modern feminist agenda at least attempt to do. The agenda for the
2017 Women’s March, for instance, while by no means a perfect
model for inclusivity or intersectionalism, still identified issues in
criminal justice reform, racial profiling and racism, LGBTQ rights,
and voting rights, along with women’s economic empowerment in
the workplace.384
Thus, while legal complexity, specious neutrality rhetoric, and
norm entrenchment likely play a role in defining the modern
feminist agenda and explaining the relative de-emphasis on
affordable and widely available childcare, so too does a desire to
focus on a more diverse set of issues, many of which did not find a
place on the agenda of high-profile Second Wave feminist groups

380 See id. (describing how “middle and upper class, married white women” sought careers
without considering who would then be called in to care for their children and households).
381 See id. at 95–97 (noting that middle and upper class women “were so blinded by their
own experiences” that they disregarded the women in lower-income classes who were already
“working in jobs that neither liberated them . . . nor made them economically self-sufficient”).
382 See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
383 See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
384 See Unity Principles, supra note 378.
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like NOW. This is not a critique. The task modern, intersectional
feminists face when defining an agenda is necessarily messier and
more difficult than those of their more singularly focused,
hegemonic predecessors. These groups may well determine that
their finite energies are better spent on issues even more critical
than childcare reform. Nevertheless, to the extent that the demands
of activist organizations help educate the public and define their
expectations, today’s working parents probably hear less about
universal childcare reform from modern feminist groups than those
parents raising children during feminism’s so-called Second Wave.
Taking this political context alongside the historical context
developed throughout this Article, this section concludes by asking:
Where might we go from here?
B. CHILDCARE TAX LAW REFORM: INCREMENTAL, MONUMENTAL
CHANGE

With the passage of the TCJA, political conservatives enacted a
tepid version of parental tax reform that fails to directly address the
problem of rising childcare costs faced by some, but not other,
families. Numerous proposals have been suggested to truly address
the care crisis faced by working families. During their recent
Presidential runs, for instance, liberal candidates such as Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Jill Stein proposed both tax
and non-tax reforms that would help parents access quality and
affordable childcare. Each of these proposals advocate for some sort
of universal childcare program.
For instance, Democratic Presidential Nominee Rodham Clinton
called for the establishment of universal preschool for all children
under four years old so that every child would be entitled to the
same “strong start.”385 Rodham Clinton also proposed a Respect and
Increased Salaries for Early Childhood Educators (RAISE)
initiative386 aimed at increasing salaries for childcare workers.
RAISE aspired to pay childcare workers a fair wage for their labor

385
386

Early Childhood Education, supra note 4.
Id.
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to, in turn, increase the availability of quality childcare options for
parents, which are sorely lacking in the United States.387
During his Presidential run, sometimes Independent, sometimes
Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders vowed to “provide all children .
. . ages [six] weeks to kindergarten, with access to a full-time, high
quality, developmentally appropriate, early care and education
program.”388 And Green Party Presidential Candidate Jill Stein
called for free childcare programs for all children.389 Nor are
universal childcare programs just the fodder for Presidential
hopefuls. In September 2017, Democratic Senator Patty Murray
and Representative Robert C. Scott introduced the Child Care for
Working Families Act,390 which builds off of Rodham Clinton’s
proposal and aspires to “address the current early learning and care
crisis by ensuring that no family under 150% of state median income
pays more than seven percent of their income on child care.”391
These ambitious plans reimagine the programs contemplated by
the vetoed CCDA. As one commentator noted, if such plans were
enacted “the federal government would finally step in and take the
kind of action that Nixon rejected in the 1970s.”392 They currently
seem far from reach.
But as history shows, even modest adjustments to the childcare
tax laws, while incapable of enacting systemic changes on their own,
might address many of the tax inequities discussed throughout this
Article. Rather than devise my own specific proposal, which I have

387 Id.; see also Jonathan Cohn, The Hell of American Day Care, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 15,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/112892/hell-american-day-care (discussing the quality
issues commonly found in U.S. child care facilities).
388 Bernie Sanders on Education, FEELTHEBERN.ORG,
http://feelthebern.org/berniesanders-on-education/ (citing Foundations for Success Act of 2011, S. 294, 112th Cong. § 3
(2011)).
389 Jill
Stein 2016 Platform: Our Power to the People Plan, JILL 2016,
https://www.jill2016.com/platform (last accessed Jan. 20, 2019).
390 Child Care for Working Families Act, S. 1806, 115th Cong. (2017).
391 Press Release, Senator Patty Murray and Representative Robert Scott, Child Care for
Working
Families
Act
(Sept.
13,
2017),
available
at
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Child%20Care%20for%20Working%20Families
%20Act_9.13_final.pdf.
392 Jonathan Cohn, Clinton’s Child Care Plan Could Get Very Expensive and Be Totally
Worth It, HUFFINGTON POST: POLITICS (May 18, 2016, 8:00 pm) (referring to President Nixon’s
veto of the Comprehensive Child Development Act in 1971).
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done extensively elsewhere,393 I will conclude by discussing some of
the proposals submitted in recent Congressional sessions that
would liberalize the childcare tax laws. As discussed in Part III.A.,
in the 114th Congressional session alone, at least 24 different
proposed bills to modify the childcare tax laws were introduced to
Committee, where they have generally perished.394
For instance, lawmakers submitted proposals to increase395 or
eliminate the childcare tax credit’s income phase-downs.396 To cite
two examples, the Helping Working Families Afford Child Care
Act397 (referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means) and
the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act of
2015398 (referred to the Committee on Finance) would have
increased the phase-down amount from its current $15,000 level to
$110,000 and $120,000, respectively.399
Without debating the ideal design of the phase-down, recall from
Part III.A. that due to decades of neglect, the current childcare tax
credit phases down to its lowest level well before a family earns the
median income for all earners. But these families may not have
reached a high enough marginal tax bracket to make the exclusion
worth their while. Increasing the phase-down levels of the childcare
tax credit could mitigate this effect, which was not intended in the
childcare tax law’s past design.
In the 114th Session, other proposals aimed to raise significantly
the dollar caps on either or both the childcare tax credit and
dependent care exclusion.400 For instance, both the Family Care
Savings Act and Working Families Relief Act would have doubled
the maximum exclusion and adjusted that amount automatically for

393 See, e.g., Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 9; Weeks
McCormack, Postpartum Taxation, supra note 72.
394 See supra note 262.
395 See Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act of 2015, S. 820, 114th
Cong. (2015) (phase-out amount increased to $120,000).
396 See, e.g., Support Working Parents Act of 2015, H.R. 2184, 114th Cong. (2015)
(eliminating the phase-out entirely); Middle Class Dependent Care Fairness Act of 2016, H.R.
6146, 114th Cong. (2016) (repealing phase-out of credit).
397 S. 661, 114th Cong. (2015).
398 S. 820.
399 S. 661 at § 2(a)(2); S. 820 at § 2(f).
400 See, e.g., S. 180, 114th Cong. (2015) (increasing cap to $7,000 and $14,000 for one and
multiple children, respectively); Working Parent Support Act of 2015, H.R. 964, 114th Cong.
(2015) (same).
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inflation going forward.401 Both the Helping Working Families
Afford Child Care and Child Care Access and Refundability
Expansion (CARE) Acts would have raised the limits on the
childcare tax credit to $8,000 and $16,000, close to triple what they
are today402 and closer to the dollar limits available in the seventies
and eighties (in inflation adjusted dollars).403 The Child and
Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act of 2015 would have
raised the maximum percentage credit from 35% to 50% when care
involves young children, reflecting the fact that cost of care is
typically highest when children are in their preschool years.404
As its name implies, the CARE Act would also have made
childcare tax benefits refundable, which they have never been.
Lawmakers have long argued for this. In fact, in a 1976 hearing
before the Senate Committee on Finance, which considered the
merits of the childcare tax credit, Senator Edward Kennedy found
the bill “seriously deficient” in its failure to make benefits
refundable.405 He lamented: “[T]he one group that is excluded from
any assistance for necessary childcare costs is the group that is most
in need of federal financial aid—those parents who are presently
below the poverty level income. . . .”406 Thus, this is hardly a new
idea and yet would be unprecedented.
Consideration of other recent proposals—even if not ultimately
enacted—could revive dormant debates, such as why we do not treat
childcare costs like other costs of earning income and what role we
expect the government to play in helping non-poor working parents
bear childcare expenses. For instance, the Middle Class Dependent
Care Fairness Act of 2016 would have repealed phase-downs

401 See Working Families Relief Act, H.R. 2618, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017) (increasing the
maximum exclusion from $5,000 to $10,500 and providing an inflation adjustment for such
exclusions); Family Care Savings Act, H.R. 750, 114th Cong. §§2(a), (b) (2015) (discussing the
increasing in exclusion from gross income and the inflation adjustment to such exclusions).
402 See Child Care Access and Refundability Expansion Act, H.R. 1492, 114th Cong. § 2
(2015) (increasing the dollar limitations from $3,000 to $8,000 and from $6,000 to $16,000);
Helping Working Families Afford Child Care Act, S. 661, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (same).
403 See supra Part II.B (discussing the increases in allowable deductions during the
seventies and eighties).
404 See Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit Enhancement Act of 2015, S. 820, 114th
Cong. § 2 (2015) (raising percentage credit to 50% for children under age five).
405 Tax Reform Act of 1976: Hearing on H.R. 10612 Before S. Comm. on Fin., 94th Cong.
227 (1976) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
406 Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss3/6

72

McCormack: America’s (D)evolving Childcare Tax Laws

2019]

(D)EVOLVING CHILDCARE TAX LAWS

1165

entirely.407 This would not be the first time that this was done. In
1976, Congress repealed phase-downs because it believed that
childcare expenses were costs of earning income that should be
claimed regardless of means. Repealing phase-downs would signal
that childcare expenses are to be treated this way again.408
Several other recent proposals would allow taxpayers the option
to claim some portion of their childcare expenses as an above-theline deduction, if the relief available under that mechanism
exceeded the benefits available under the dependent and childcare
credit and/or exclusion.409 There are sound reasons to be wary of
using an above-the-line deduction as a mechanism for relief because
of the fact that it creates an “upside-down-subsidy.” Because the
value of a deduction depends on one’s marginal tax bracket, this is
absolutely true as a matter of mathematics. When a taxpayer in a
40% marginal tax bracket deducts $100 from his taxable income, he
saves $40 in taxes, whereas a taxpayer in the 20% bracket would
save only $20 when taking the same deduction.
These concerns are very valid. But they are also concerns that
exist for every single deduction allowed by the Code (whether it falls
above- or below-the-line), including the deductions allowed for many
other costs of earning income. Before dismissing the idea of allowing
some parents to deduct expenses above-the-line, it is at least worth
pausing to consider the historical significance this change would
implement and remember how we first came to have the percentage
credit mechanism that is utilized in today’s childcare tax laws. As
discussed in Part II.B, Second-Wave feminist groups like NOW
demanded in its Bill of Rights that the Code allow mothers to deduct
childcare costs like other business expenses and also demonstrated
at the Tax Court in support of the reform.410 In the 1970’s,
lawmakers sympathetic to the demands of feminist groups like
NOW attempted to change the then-below-the-line deduction for
childcare expenses to an above-the-line deduction, so that all
taxpayers could benefit regardless of whether they itemized or

See H.R. 6146, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016).
See supra Part II.B.
409 See, e.g., Working Parent Support Act of 2015, H.R. 964, 114th Cong. (2015) (allowing
above-the-line deductions for childcare expenses); S. 180, 114th Cong. § 1(b) (2015) (same).
410 See NOW Bill of Rights, supra note 25, at 474 (demanding that there be a “revision of
tax laws to permit the deduction of home and child-care expenses for working parents”).
407
408
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claimed the standard deduction. But because less sympathetic
lawmakers were squeamish about treating childcare expenses like
other costs of earning income, the percentage credit was conceived
and used as a workaround.
Thus, allowing working childcare costs to be deducted above-theline would move the Code to a place where lawmakers have never
been willing to go before.411 Allowing some women to deduct some
portion of their childcare expenses like other costs of earning income
might have strong symbolic value and effect.
This does not mean that an above-the-line deduction is
ultimately preferable to a percentage credit. But it seems
worthwhile to have a more robust debate that takes into account the
history of our childcare tax laws. Even if it is ultimately decided that
a percentage credit mechanism is superior—which it very well may
be—it is worth asking why working childcare costs are singled out
for different treatment than many other costs of earning income.
Moreover, if it were determined that there were compelling
enough reasons to allow some parents to deduct childcare expenses
like other costs of earning income, there are numerous ways that
Congress could restore progressivity. For instance, Congress could
increase the benefits available to lower and middle-income parents
through a targeted modification of existing childcare tax laws. Or
Congress could limit the rate against which an above-the-line
deduction might be claimed, allowing the deduction to create the
same tax savings to all families with sufficient income to claim it.
In short, there are many proposals that could respond to the
inequities discussed in this Article. And even modest adjustments
to our childcare tax laws might enact historically significant reform
for working parents.
V. CONCLUSION
According to its proponents, the hastily passed TCJA provided
much-needed relief to working parents. The TCJA did expand some
benefits available to parents with dependent children. But all of
these benefits can be claimed regardless of whether a family incurs
childcare costs to earn income. To directly address these costs,–
See Weeks McCormack, Overtaxing the Working Family, supra note 109, at 580; see also
Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation, supra note 6278, at 1350–66.
411
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– which may be one of the highest in a family’s budget–– Congress
might have reformed the two provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code that allow working parents to recover the childcare costs they
actually incur. Due to strict limitations, many working parents—
especially those with preschool aged children—had only been able
to claim tax relief for a fraction of their annual costs. As a result,
the Code was taxing families with different childcare needs
inequitably. Because the TCJA did not alter these laws, it entirely
failed to address these problems.
This Article explores the (d)evolution of our childcare and other
parental tax laws in order to situate some of the TCJA’s so-called
reforms into their historical context. As shown, America’s early
childcare tax laws were deliberately designed to benefit only
mothers who needed to work and deliberately favored the one
breadwinner model for married families of above-moderate means.
But in the seventies and eighties, our childcare tax laws evolved to
allow all working parents to recover a much more significant portion
of their childcare costs, and, therefore, taxed family models more
equitably than predecessor laws. Yet in the decades following this
evolution, Congress allowed childcare tax benefits to devolve while
expanding other parental tax benefits that do not depend on actual
childcare costs, restoring the inequitable taxation of families with
different childcare needs.
This history shows that the TCJA’s supposed “reforms” are just
another piece of a well-worn pattern. It also informs debates about
future tax reforms that might actually address the American
working family’s “care crisis.” In short, while incapable of enacting
the systemic changes contemplated by some, modest adjustments to
our childcare tax laws could nevertheless move the law in directions
that have been historically resisted. This move would at least begin
to address the inequitable taxation of otherwise similarly situated
families with different childcare needs and perhaps even revive
dormant debates about the role the American government should
play in supporting parents.
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